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Abstract: 
In the late 1990’s, a problem-oriented policing initiative in Boston, “Operation: 
Ceasefire”, achieved significant reductions in youth homicide by focusing on gang 
behavior. The program was driven by a concept known as “Focused Deterrence”. Gang 
members are typically frequent offenders for whom general deterrence mechanisms have 
little effect. Additionally, the social norms of gangs often encourage offending behavior, 
making typical attempts to deter futile. Focused deterrence attempts to modify individual 
behavior and group norms with a credible and severe threat of collective punishment for 
an individual offending behavior. In “Operation Ceasefire”, when a gang member 
committed a homicide, his gang was targeted for an “enforcement action” in which 
resources from many agencies across the criminal justice system were coordinated to 
severely punish the gang. Those enforcement actions were then advertised to other gangs 
as an example of what happens to gangs that commit homicides. 
             The success of the Boston program encouraged other jurisdictions across the 
country to implement their own versions of the “Ceasefire” project. In recent years, 
violence in Rochester, N.Y. came to be seen as consistent with the gang driven problem 
described in Boston and a version of Operation Ceasefire was implemented in October 
2003. This study examines the “Ceasefire” program as implemented in Rochester, NY 
from October 2003 to December 2004. Using an interrupted time-series research design, 
the author finds limited but statistically significant reductions in homicides of Black 
Males ages 15-30 during the Ceasefire intervention period. Despite theses finding, 
increases in 2005 homicides of Black Males ages 15-30 have raised concerns about the 
effectiveness of the program. A Postscript examines the 2005 increase and considers 
explanations for the increase associated with potential theoretical and operational 
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Since October 2003, the Criminal Justice System in Rochester, NY has 
collectively operated an acclaimed program “Operation: Ceasefire”, which had great 
success in reducing youth homicide in Boston during the late 1990s. The program (from 
here on referred to as Ceasefire) drew upon research indicating much of Boston’s youth 
violence problem involved a gang1 component; victims or suspects were members or 
incidents were the direct product of gang activity. As a result, the program is meant to 
harness an important characteristic of offending patterns in young adults: offending in 
groups (Zimring, 1998).  
There are two components to the program, enforcement actions and 
communications. The enforcement actions are strong multi-agency “crackdowns” on any 
member of a targeted group who is engaged in illegal activity. A group becomes targeted 
when someone in the group is involved in a homicide. The communications component 
(known as the “call-in”) interacts with other gang members, warning them that if their 
crew is involved in a homicide, the whole crew will be subject to an enforcement action. 
Gang members obtain this message at a special meeting (the call-in) they are forced to 
attend due to their status as probationers or parolees. Those gang members are then asked 
to act as messengers to their gang. The overall objective of the program is to deter groups 
from violent activity initially through the threat of focused formal sanctions (the 
enforcement action) and to reinforce the deterrent effect through informal sanctions (peer 
pressure not to offend) generated from within the gang.  
This study intends to evaluate the effectiveness of the Rochester Ceasefire 
program from October 2003 to December 2004, the first 15 months of the program. The 
author believes the evaluation will show evidence of the program’s success but that the 




                                                 
1 For the purposes of this paper, the words “gang”, “group”, “crew”, or “posse” will be used 





The Roots of “Ceasefire” 
The program evaluated in this study, Rochester Ceasefire, cannot be understood 
without understanding the original program upon which it is modeled. The Boston Gun 
Project was a problem-oriented policing initiative sponsored by the National Institute of 
Justice, and directed by David Kennedy, Anthony Braga, and Anne Piehl of the Kennedy 
School of Government at Harvard University. The project was guided by an inter-agency 
working group tasked with examining the nature of Boston’s youth gun violence problem 
and developing intervention strategies to combat it. The working group members 
included representatives from the Boston Police Department, Suffolk County Probation, 
Suffolk County District Attorney’s office, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 
and “Streetworkers”- a community outreach organization.  
As the working group began to understand the problems of youth violent crime in 
Boston, they identified a correlation between the violence and a seemingly vast network 
of small, loosely organized gangs in Boston, particularly in the predominantly black 
neighborhoods of Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan. These gangs were not gangs in the 
traditional sense of the West Coast Bloods, Crips, or Latin Kings, but instead were 
groups of tight-knit youths from the same community that were collectively involved in 
criminal behavior, most typically drug sales. These local gangs seemed to be responsible 
for much of the problem of youth violence in Boston. As Kennedy notes (2001): 
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A relatively small number of youths were at high risk for both killing and being 
killed. They were gang members chronically in trouble with the authorities and 
known by working group members, often personally, because of their 
participation in gang activities, frequent arrests, status as probationers and 
prisoners, and visibility both on and off the streets. 
 Indeed, the youths involved in the gangs were widely recognized across the 
Criminal Justice community. Many of the gang members were known across the police 
department, from administration to patrol officers for not only the violent crimes, but also 
for a continual stream of small-time drug offenses. Further, most gang members were 
well known by Probation and Parole officers as many were on one of the two forms of 
supervision. Finally, street outreach workers knew the gang members personally because 
of their imposing presence in the neighborhoods. 
The working group also learned that the gang-related violence in Boston had 
created a culture of fear among Boston youths. The pervasive fear of victimization among 
youths in Boston had led many to carry firearms for protection, and thereby raising the 
volatility of an already dangerous community. 
During the process of examining violent crime problem in Boston, the working 
group observed an event which eventually proved to be the foundation for the 
“Operation: Ceasefire” program. Boston Police and the Streetworkers organization 
combined forces to crack down on a gang that was acting especially violent in the 
Wendover Street area. To conduct the crackdown, the team drew upon all resources 
available to them, regardless of agency, pulling every “lever” available to them in the 
criminal justice system in order to round up members of the gang. The strategy used all 
of the gang members’ contacts with the Criminal Justice system to the advantage of the 
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police. The Boston Police worked with probation to strictly enforce probation conditions, 
they worked with the District Attorney to concentrate on the gang members’ cases, and 
not offer plea bargains, and the police themselves applied constant pressure to gang 
member hangout locations. 
A crucial element of the crackdown was honest conversations with gang 
members, either on the street with Streetworkers or at the time of arrest with police, 
explaining that the police were going to continue the crackdown on all the gang members 
until the violence stopped. Indeed, violence stopped, and, by the end of the crackdown, 
“…officers reported Wendover Street gang members actually pleading with them to 
remain at the end of the operation because the area was then so safe that they wanted it to 
stay that way.” (Kennedy et. al, 2001)  
From this experience, the working group learned two key lessons: First, that the 
“lever-pulling” gang crackdown strategy was effective in reducing violent crime in the 
neighborhood the gang was terrorizing. Second, that gang members feared such a 
crackdown, and when police and street outreach workers confronted gang members with 
the threat of such a crackdown, they reduced their levels of offending. These lessons 
formed the basis for their initiative to address violent crime in Boston, “Operation: 
Ceasefire”.  
The “Operation: Ceasefire” initiative which developed took the lessons learned in 
the Wendover Street experience and expanded them, attempting to make an impact on 
violent crime citywide by addressing all of the gangs in Boston.  
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The resulting process in the “Operation: Ceasefire” initiative was fairly simple. 
The first step was to identify a gang that was actively engaged in violence and undertake 
a crackdown on the gang members by using the “lever-pulling” strategy. The second step 
was to identify as many gangs in the city as possible, as well as identifying their 
membership and specifically, the members under supervision (Probation/Parole).  
The third step was critical to the citywide success of the “Operation: Ceasefire” 
project. The working group held a series of meetings, known as “call-ins”. Gang 
members were invited to these meetings; those under supervision were required to go to 
as a condition of their probation or parole. At the meetings, the gang members received 
an important message about their gang’s behavior: violence was no longer tolerable, we 
know your gang is involved in violence, and if your gang continues to be involved in 
violence, we will use every tool we have to crackdown on your gang, just like we did to 
Wendover Street and Bowdoin Street (the Bowdoin Street gang was subject to a highly 
publicized and successful “pulling-levers” crackdown prior to the “call-in” meetings).  
The gang members then listened to representatives from the Boston Police, Probation, 
Parole, the District Attorney’s office and the U.S. Attorney’s office, who told the gang 
members about the tools their agency would use in the crackdown. In describing the tools 
available for the crackdown, each agency representative re-iterated the core message that 
“we are not putting up with this stuff [violence] any more”, and that “if we focus on you, 
you can’t win, so don’t make us [act]” (Kennedy, 2001). The purpose of this 
communication strategy was to use the threat of a crackdown to deter the gangs, using the 
call-in attendees as messengers for their respective gangs.  
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The message in the meetings was not only a threat. At the end of the call-in, 
members of the “Streetworkers” group explained to the gang members that the entire 
community does not want to see its youth dying and that the “Ceasefire” project is not 
meant to punish, but to prevent more deaths. Further, the street outreach workers offered 
assistance to the gang members in obtaining employment and health services, as well as 
protection from other gangs. However, the key in the call-in meetings was to let the gang 
members know that the criminal justice system is watching their gang, and that “we [the 
criminal justice system] brought you Bowdoin Street. If this violence does not stop, you 
are next” (Kennedy, 2001). The ongoing fourth step in the process was to follow up with 
a “pulling levers” crackdown whenever gangs engaged in violence. 
 The results of the “Operation: Ceasefire” initiative have been highly touted at the 
national level for the initiative’s remarkable success. During the peak operation period of 
the program (June 1996-June 1998), “Operation: Ceasefire” is associated with a 63% 
reduction in youth homicides per month in Boston, a 32% decrease in shots fired per 
month, and a 25% reduction in the number of gun assaults (Kennedy, 2001). As a result 
of the success of “Operation: Ceasefire” in Boston, numerous other jurisdictions have 
attempted to implement “Ceasefire” programs, and the program is cited as an example 
program for jurisdictions seeking to reduce gun violence through the Department of 
Justice’s “Project Safe Neighborhoods” gun violence initiative. 
Rochester, NY and Ceasefire 
Rochester, NY is well suited to experiment with violence reduction programs. For 
a city of 218,000 residents, Rochester has an unusually high homicide rate. From 1995-
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1999, the average homicide rate in Rochester was 21.34 per 100,000, higher than all 
cities in New York State. For the 95-99 period, the Rochester homicide rate more than 
doubled that of Boston’s (9.42 per 100,000). Like Boston, homicides were 
disproportionately concentrated, both by geography and demography. Analysis of 
homicides by John Klofas of RIT found homicide victimization to be overwhelmingly 
concentrated in a geographic area known as “the crescent”- An area characterized by 
minority residents, high poverty, failing schools, unemployment, weak economic activity, 
and crime. According to Klofas, 80% of homicides (from 1991-2001) occurred in the 
“crescent”, yet only 27% of the total Rochester population lives in that area. Even more 
startling, homicide victimization for young black males (15-30) in the crescent was 520 
per 100,000, 65 times higher than the national homicide rate of 8 per 100,000. And young 
black males were not just being victimized; they were also perpetrating homicides at a 
similar rate. Reviews of homicide incidents conducted by Klofas and the Rochester 
Police Department from 2000-2003 indicated that a group dynamic was involved in many 
of the homicides. This group dynamic resembled that of Boston’s: a loosely organized 
network of individuals engaged in drug sales and more serious criminal activity. The 
parallels of Rochester’s violent crime problem to Boston made Ceasefire a logical and 
attractive program to experiment with.  
The Rochester Criminal Justice community has attempted to implement Ceasefire 
on a number of occasions since reports of Boston’s success began to circulate in 1998. 
The first version was initiated in 1998 by the U.S. Attorney’s office of Western New 
York after members of the local criminal justice community learned about “Operation: 
Ceasefire” at a national conference. Like Boston, Rochester’s early attempt at Ceasefire 
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identified groups actively involved in violence. These groups were brought in to call-ins 
at community centers and given a message that was somewhat less clear than the Boston 
message. While the core message of “violence will no longer be tolerated, if your group 
continues to be involved in violence, the whole group will face new and serious 
punishments” was used, this early Rochester version relied heavily on community 
speakers (including ministers, activists, and outreach workers) to articulate the impact of 
violence on the community. While such testimony is powerful, it may have obscured the 
intended message.  
The first iteration of Ceasefire in Rochester began to fall apart after 1998 for two 
reasons. First, the Criminal Justice agencies never performed an enforcement action on a 
group to use as an example, nor had they actually followed up on groups that received the 
message, but continued to engage in violence. The lack of enforcement credibility may 
have seriously undermined the deterrence effect the agencies were trying to generate. 
Secondly, the criminal justice agencies involved decided that the deterrence message 
would be more effective by communicating it beyond gang members and out to juveniles 
who had not yet begun to involve themselves in a gang or commit serious violent crime. 
Therefore, the group started to take the deterrence message to schools, speaking before 
audiences of elementary and middle school students. While the deterrence message may 
have some impact on younger children, evaluations of the D.A.R.E. program have shown 
that educating similar audiences about the risks of drug use has little impact on the 
child’s future propensity for drug use (GAO, 2003). Likewise, the move toward a 
deterrence message in the schools got away from the focused deterrence model of 
Boston’s Ceasefire, more closely resembling the broad and weak level of deterrence 
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typically exerted by the Criminal Justice system, a level characterized by non-credible 
empty threats from an overburdened system.  
The second iteration of Ceasefire in Rochester was implemented from 2002-2003, 
as a byproduct of a collaboration made possible through the federal Strategic Approaches 
to Community Safety Initiatives (SACSI) program. SACSI emphasized research-based 
interagency problem solving at the local level. The goal of the Rochester program was to 
use homicide research from John Klofas to drive homicide intervention strategies. 
Research findings showing the geographic, demographic, and group-related concentration 
of homicides convinced the SACSI team that the Ceasefire model was particularly 
applicable to the problem, and resurrected the Ceasefire program.  
While the goal of the second version remained the same as before (homicide and 
violent crime reduction), Rochester again implemented the model in a slightly different 
way than the original Boston version.  The second Rochester Ceasefire version focused 
on individuals (rather than gang members) on probation or parole that were believed to be 
at future risk to be victims or suspects in a violent crime according to their probation and 
parole officers. The goal of this second version was to create a threat of enforcement 
attention on high-rate offenders and generate a focused deterrent effect among the 
targeted individuals. Like the earlier Rochester iteration, the second Rochester Ceasefire 
failed to follow up on the sanctions that were being threatened during the call-in. While 
the second version deviated substantially from the original Boston model, the selection 
process for high-rate offenders showed anecdotal success: two individuals selected for 
the program were murdered before they took part in the Ceasefire meeting. 
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Finally, the most recent iteration of Ceasefire (the version that is the subject of 
this evaluation) originated in summer 2003 as an attempt to align the previous Rochester 
versions with the original design of the Boston model. This effort was led by Rochester 
Police Department together with John Klofas of Rochester Institute of Technology and 
David Kennedy of Harvard University. The goal of this iteration, (which is still under 
way and the author continues to play a role in the development and operation of the 
program) was to make a serious attempt to implement Ceasefire in a way that could 
meaningfully address the problem of group-related homicide, and hopefully replicate the 
same results as observed in Boston. As a result of the effort to mirror the original Boston 
program, the current Rochester Ceasefire is quite different from the earlier Rochester 
iterations. 
Contrasting the Rochester Iterations 
The first and probably most important difference between the current version of 
Rochester Ceasefire and the two earlier iterations is the use of enforcement to produce a 
legitimate and credible deterrence message. The current Ceasefire iteration was the only 
of the three Rochester versions to commence an enforcement action against a group for 
the purpose of having an example to show at the first call-in. For the first call-in of the 
current Ceasefire, a gang named “Thurston Zoo” was chosen as the example enforcement 
target due to one of their members’ participation in a 2003 homicide. The enforcement 
action used was primarily drug-related in nature, using undercover officers to obtain 
multiple drug buys from many members of the group. Group members on probation or 
parole were watched closely, and a probationer in the group was violated when the 
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opportunity arose. On the prosecution side of the enforcement action, a Assistant District 
Attorney was assigned to give specific attention to the cases (including no plea bargains) 
to ensure that the group members were not treated they way they would typically expect 
in the Criminal Justice system.  
The enforcement action then served to bring legitimacy to the deterrence message 
because it allowed the speakers at the “call-in” to say: “we are serious, look what we did 
to Thurston Zoo, we will do that to your group to if your group is involved in a 
homicide.” Since the initial enforcement action on Thurston Zoo, the Rochester Criminal 
Justice community has remained true to the Ceasefire threat by continuing to go after any 
group involved in a homicide. By December 2004, four enforcement actions had occurred 
against groups that were involved in homicide and three enforcement actions were 
pending. These enforcement actions involved the use long-term undercover narcotics 
investigations, prioritization of those cases by the District Attorney’s office, tightened 
supervisory conditions of probationers and parolees in those groups, and in one 
enforcement action, a Federal consipracy prosecution. This commitment of resources to 
enforcement actions was a notable characteristic of the original Boston program that was 
missing in the earlier versions of Rochester Ceasefire. 
Another distinguishing factor among the Rochester Ceasefire iterations was the 
clarity and credibility of the message. In the current program, the deterrence message 
communicated to “call-in” attendees was short and clear: “If your crew is involved in a 
homicide, all of the illegal activity of the crew will be targeted”. This message represents 
a stark departure from the muddled messages of the earlier versions, which admonished 
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the attendees not to engage in broad categories of offending, from violence to drug 
dealing to all offending for fear of increased attention from law enforcement. The 
strength of using homicide as the “trigger” for action by law enforcement is that the 
resources for meaningful enforcement actions are limited, and in order to deliver a 
credible deterrence message, law enforcement must follow through with the actions they 
threaten. The messages used in the earlier Rochester Ceasefire versions prohibited so 
much behavior as to make credible follow through with enforcement actions impossible. 
In this regard, the message in the current program represents the clearest and most 
credible deterrence message of the three Rochester Ceasefire programs. 
Another unique characteristic of the current iteration (relative to the earlier 
Rochester models) was a focus on the development of gang intelligence. In the Boston 
Ceasefire and the first Rochester Ceasefire, groups or individuals were identified through 
an anecdotal process, gathering information from patrol officers. In the current Ceasefire, 
the Rochester Police Records system was used to correlate names and known group 
locations to identify likely members of groups. Markers used to confirm an individual’s 
membership in a group included a combination of the following identifiers: self-
identification as a member to a police officer during a contact, repeated police contacts 
with other known group members, repeated police contacts at known locations, and 
police identification of individual as a member of a certain group. In addition to review of 
police records data, qualitative data was gathered through intelligence meetings with 
select proactive police officers who were recommended by their superiors for their wealth 
of “street” knowledge, particularly of neighborhood gangs. 
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The process of implementing Ceasefire in Rochester evidences the difficulty of 
translating a program from one jurisdiction to another. Integrating strategic focus, 
organizational commitment, and agency resources can reshape a program in many 
unintended ways. Through this process, a model has emerged in Rochester that most 
closely resembles the original Boston program, and, as desired by the Criminal Justice 
partners involved in the program, a model with the greatest potential to address the 























 The Ceasefire strategy is a multi-layered approach that seeks to incapacitate 
groups that commit homicide and deter other groups from involvement in future 
homicides. In Rochester as in many cities, the main goal of initiatives like Ceasefire is 
not simply to respond to crime, but to prevent it. The preventative aspects of Ceasefire 
come in two forms. First, the targeting of groups that have committed homicides has an  
ancillary preventative effect, as these gang members have already illustrated a propensity 
toward violence. Incapacitating these crews prevents further violence, but a great cost, as 
the enforcement actions against such crews require expenditures of time, labor, and 
capital.  
The second, and primary, source of preventative power in Ceasefire comes from 
the communication of the Ceasefire message at the call-in. The goal of this message is to 
prevent future group-related homicides by deterring groups from violence through the 
credible threat of an enforcement action. In contrast to the enforcement action, the 
deterrence message can ideally be highly efficient as the resources cost needed to conduct 
a call-in are lower than the cost associated with an enforcement action, yet the potential 
of the call-in to prevent homicide is greater than an enforcement action simply to the 
population affected.  
Clearly, the deterrent effect generated by the Ceasefire program is critical to the 
goal of the program, preventing group-involved homicides. Indeed, the success of the 
program is almost entirely dependent upon the generation of a deterrent effect among 
gangs. For this reason, the theory and empirical observations of deterrence effects are of 
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necessary to examine for this study. This chapter examines the concepts and proofs of 
deterrence theories.  
 
Foundations of Deterrence Theories 
The criminal justice system exists not only to incapacitate and punish, but also to 
deter those who would consider crime with the threat of punishment. Deterrence theories 
derive from the philosophical foundations of law and justice, particularly, the social 
utility of punishment as a component of a justice system. In “On Crimes and 
Punishments”, Cesare Beccaria (1764) is among the first to discuss the idea that when 
applied fairly, the threat of punishment can serve to deter offending behavior. He 
concludes that punishment for a violation of law must be swift, certain, transparent, and 
proportional in order for the act of punishment to be justified as socially useful (rather 
than a base act of violence by society against the condemned). By having certainty, 
proportionality, transparency, and swiftness in the application of punishment for law 
violations, a potential offender will always know what punishment one can expect from 
each particular type of crime. Societial knowledge about punishments and their consistent 
application, devoid of subjectivity or corruption, creates, according to Beccaria, fear of 
laws. The fear of laws has a socially useful purpose, to prevent future crime. Therefore, 
punishment for law violation which is swift certain, transparent, and proportional is 
justifiable as a restriction of individual rights because it serves to create fear of 
punishment in society, and thereby acts to prevent future crime. 
Do you want to prevent crimes? See to it that the laws are clear and simple and 
that the entire force of a nation is united in their defense and that no part of it is 
employed to destroy them. See to it that the laws favor not so much classes of men 
as men themselves. See to it that men fear the laws and fear nothing else. For fear 
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In “Principles of Morals and Legislation”, Jeremy Bentham echoes Beccaria’s sentiments 
on the utility of punishment, also arguing that the preventive effect punishment has upon 
society is a justification for the inherently evil act of punishment.  
But all punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil. Upon the 
principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be 
admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.   
 
Bentham, well known as one of the fathers of Utilitarianism, notes Beccaria as a major 
influence in his academic heritage. Bentham borrows from Beccaria the concept of utility 
maximization; that humans seek to maximize their individual pleasure and minimize their 
pain. Therefore, according to Bentham: “The value of the punishment must not be less in 
any case than what is sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the offence” (Bentham, 
1822). The notion of utility maximization is articulated in “On Crimes and Punishments”, 
when Beccaria proclaims “La massima felicità divisa del maggior numero”. Here 
Beccaria implies that because humans seek to maximize pleasure, good laws are one that 
should “create the greatest happiness shared by the greatest number”.  
The idea of social utility, shared by Beccaria and Bentham, is clearly evident in 
their ideas on the value of punishment in society. Both suggest that society gains a benefit 
by punishing an individual for crimes because the punishment imposes “pain” relative to 
the corresponding “pleasure” derived from committing the crime. The fear of “pain” 
therefore, prevents others in society from committing the same crime, and therefore, 
potential criminals are more likely to restrain from crimes than if no punishment were 
attached. This theory, as articulated by Beccaria and Bentham, comprises the 
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fundamental theory of deterrence, also known as “simple deterrence” or “mere 
deterrence”.  
Despite the similarity of thought between Beccaria and Bentham, an important 
distinction must be made between the two when discussing the issue of the extent to 
which pain inflicted should exceed the benefit of the criminal offense. To Beccaria, the 
key element of effective deterrence is a system of laws that are clear, objectively and 
equally applied, and most importantly, proportional to the crime committed. Beccaria 
believed that man’s fear of man produced violence, and that a society where man feared 
not other men, but laws, would be a society where most crime would be prevented. 
Therefore, the “pain” inflicted by punishment for crime must always be proportional to 
the crime committed, otherwise, the laws will appear unjust, and men will no longer fear 
laws.  
To put Beccaria’s assertions in context, On Crimes and Punishments was written 
at a time (1764) where the European aristocratic class was reinventing itself as the 
intellectual elite, persuading reform of disproportionate social treatment between the 
common man, aristocracy, and monarchy. Therefore, the equitable treatment of all in 
society becomes a primary issue of Beccaria’s concern.  
In contrast to Beccaria’s notions of strict proportionality, Bentham’s ideas about 
the use of punishment are informed much more by the fundamental concepts in 
Utilitarianism. Bentham’s believed that the “pain” of the punishment “must be sufficient 
to outweigh” pleasure of the offense.  
While the difference between Bentham and Beccaria may seem pedantic, it is in 
fact quite different. The implication of Beccaria’s notions is that the justification for the 
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punishment of the individual comes from the fear generated in society by the punishment, 
and while the generation of such fear has social value, such value should not come at the 
cost of fair and equal treatment, which is why the punishment should be proportional to 
the crime.  
In contrast, Bentham uses basic utilitarian precepts to justify punishment of the 
individual. Because society is more likely to fear a punishment that is slightly more 
severe than the associated crime, society is more likely to be safe because fewer people 
will be willing to accept the risk of over-punishment. Therefore, the justification for the 
over-punishment of the criminal is in the benefit to society of crime reductions that occur 
from fear of over-punishment. 
Despite the difference between Beccaria and Bentham over the extent of 
acceptable punishment, both identify that a socially valuable use of punishment is to 
generate fear of punishment in society. This idea articulated by Beccaria and Bentham is 
known as “simple” or “mere deterrence”. The idea is referred to as “simple” because the 
idea expressed is empirically untenable. A definition of deterrence by Zimring and 
Hawkins (1973) illustrates the problem of “simple deterrence” theory: 
The theory of simple deterrence is that threats can reduce crime by causing a 
change of heart, induced by the unpleasantness of the specific consequences 
threatened 
 
Andaenes (1966) suggests that mere deterrence is “the frightening effect of 
punishment.” As a phenomenon in society, deterrence is impossible to observe. One 
cannot possibly observe the “change of heart” that the Zimring definition suggests. For 
hundreds of years, the conundrum of deterrence as a conjecture rather than an empirically 
testable theory limited the ability of researchers to examine the concept scientifically. In 
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“Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence” Gibbs (1975) makes a substantial contribution to 
the conceptualization of deterrence effect in society. Gibbs argues that in order to study 
deterrence, the deterrence effect must be placed into a context. 
Since deterrence is inherently unobservable, rules of inference pertaining to it are 
unfalsifiable unless stated in the context of a theory. In turn, any deterrence theory 
necessarily makes assertions in which “deterrence,” “deters,’ or “deterred” is 
constituent term. 
 
Gibbs notes that because the idea of deterrence must be placed into context in order to be 
empirically studied, a multitude of theories can be created explaining how all the 
different properties of punishments exert a deterrent effect on one or more individuals. 
The notion of contextual deterrence then finally provides a “context” for the examination 
and assessment of deterrence. 
 
Deterrence in Context 
Two primary categorical contexts of deterrence exist within the literature of 
deterrence theory, general deterrence and specific deterrence, and within these categories 
variations exist. The difference between general deterrence and specific deterrence has 
long been known. Bentham aptly noted in Principles of Penal Law “determent is equally 
applicable to the situation of the already-punished delinquent and that of other persons at 
large”. The first effect noted by Bentham is the general fear instilled in society from the 
threat of punishment. This effect is known in deterrence literature as “general 
deterrence”. The second effect noted by Bentham is the fear of future punishment which 
should be instilled into a criminal who has experienced punishment and been released. 
This second type of deterrent effect, known as specific deterrence suggests that criminal 
laws not only threaten the population at large from committing crimes, but also threaten 
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individuals from committing future crime after they have already experienced 
punishment. 
 Within the broad theories of general and specific deterrence, a variety of 
distinctions have been made in regard to the range of deterrent effects sanctions have 
upon one or more individuals.  The theory of “partial deterrence” (Zimring & Hawkins 
1973) or “restrictive deterrence” (Gibbs 1975) suggests that the threat imposed by 
sanctions often causes one or more individuals to reduce their levels of offending (in 
severity, frequency, or both). Gibbs provides a strong example of this phenomenon:  
…all motorists exceed the vehicular speed limit occasionally. But they may have 
some sense (however dim) of a cumulative risk of punishment, and for that reason 
they do not violate speed regulations regularly, flagrantly (e.g., driving 60 miles 
per hour in a zone posted for 30), or uncritically (without regard to avoiding 
detection). 
 
An important characteristic of the theory of “partial deterrence” is recognition that 
a sanction has not just an “all or nothing” deterrent effect, instead, some individuals will 
be deterred entirely, some will be not deterred at all, and some will be moderately 
deterred without ceasing offending. Partial deterrence can be equally applied to the 
theories of both general and specific deterrence. In the case of general deterrence, the 
threat of sanction may cause those who have offended one or more times to reduce the 
frequency in which they commit the crime to which the sanction is attached, and/or 
choose instead to commit crimes with a less harsh sanction. In terms of specific 
deterrence, individuals who have already been punished for the commission of a crime 
will be “partially deterred” if they commit the same crime with less frequency, or commit 
lesser crimes instead of committing the crime for which they were punished. 
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Another important distinction to make within the general deterrence theory is the 
notion of absolute versus marginal deterrence. The theories of absolute and marginal 
deterrence are useful when evaluating the deterrence effect of a sanction. Absolute 
deterrence theory suggests that given a crime, when a sanction is attached to its 
commission fewer incidences of the crime will occur than if no sanction is attached. 
Marginal deterrence theory suggests that given a crime, when a sanction exists for it and 
when that crime occurs in a community at certain rate, an increased sanction will produce 
a crime rate lower than the crime rate produced with the original sanction. The 
contribution of absolute and marginal deterrence to deterrence literature is the 
acknowledgement that while deterrence is an individual phenomenon, the phenomenon 
can be observed at the aggregate level when, holding constant other variables, crime rates 
vary with the existence or level of sanction imposed on the population. Therefore, a good 
deterrence policy should be both effective (exerting an absolute deterrent effect) as well 
as efficient (exerting a marginal deterrent effect). 
The final distinction to address involves the literature on length of deterrent 
effect. Interrupted time-series studies (discussed later), done most notably by Sherman 
(1990) and Ross (1982) have observed temporal influence upon deterrent effects. In his 
studies of drunk-driving sanctions, Ross (1982) determined that sanction changes 
produced “initial deterrence”, however, the changes provide no long-term deterrence 
effects. Sherman (1990) articulates this phenomenon as “initial deterrence decay” and 
distinguishes between “initial deterrence” (the immediate deterrent effect which is 
created by a change in certainty or severity of punishment) and “residual deterrence” (the 
long-term deterrent effect of a sanction change which is weaker than the initial deterrent 
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effect). While these effects could apply to both general and specific deterrence theories, 
research on this issue is constrained to general deterrence. 
 
Empirical Evidence of Deterrence Theories 
While many scholars have studied the idea of deterrence since Beccaria and 
Bentham, work on developing empirical proof of deterrence did not begin until the mid 
1960s. Becker (1967) was the first to construct a mathematical formula of general 
deterrence. The basic formula is: 
EU = pU(Y-f) +(1-p) U(Y) 
In the model, pU(Y-f) represents the utility of the benefits of committing a crime if 
punished, and (1-p) U(Y) represents the utility of the benefits of committing the crime 
and avoiding punishment. Becker suggests that increasing cost variables p (the certainty 
of punishment) and f (the severity of punishment) decreases the expected utility (EU) of a 
crime, and therefore, changes in these variables can increase the deterrent effect an 
individual experiences (note the exclusion of celerity- a key element of punishment as 
articulated by Bentham). 
Since the Becker model, research on general deterrence has expanded 
considerably. According to Nagin, (1998) empirical study of general deterrence has 
branched into three primary categories, ecological studies, interrupted time-series studies, 





Deterrence Evidence in Ecological Studies 
Research in the ecological study category examines aggregate data for negative 
relationships between crime rates and the sanction cost variables (certainty and severity). 
In these types of studies, sanction variables fall into two categories: prison-based and 
police-based. 
In the category of prison-based sanction variables on crime rates, researchers 
looked for a negative relationship between crime rates and data gathered after the 
offender was found guilty (such as prison sentencing length and proportion of offenders 
for a crime which end up in prison). For example, Gibbs’ 1968 study compared across 
states the impact of probability of imprisonment for homicide (derived by dividing the 
number of persons incarcerated for homicide in a state by the number of homicides 
reported in the state) and homicide imprisonment sentences on homicide rates. Similar 
studies done by Gray and Martin (1969) and Bean and Cushing (1971) verify Gibbs’ 
finding of a negative association between homicide rate and the prison-based sanction 
variables, giving evidence to support the idea that increases in severity and certainty of 
punishment have a deterrent effect. Using the same general sanction variables, Antunes 
and Hunt (1973) Chiricos and Waldo (1970), Tittle (1969), and Logan (1971, 1972) have 
examined UCR index crimes. While these studies also found evidence for a deterrent 
effect when looking at both sanction variables for effect in homicide rate, all the studies 
only showed the negative association between the offenders-to-inmates ratio and the 
remaining index crimes.  
One of the problems of these early ecological studies was the lack of control for 
socioeconomic factors influencing the data. Ehrlich (1973) and Forst (1976) both used 
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functions that extensively controlled for such factors. Surprisingly, the studies had 
opposite conclusions. Ehrlich, analyzing data from the 1960’s, found statistically 
significant negative associations between the prison-based sanction variables and the 
index crime rate. Forst, who analyzed 1970’s data and used a function model similar to 
Ehrlich, found no negative associations between the index crime rate and the prison-
based sanction variables.  
While many of the prison-based ecological studies provide some evidence to 
suggest the existence of a general deterrent effect, many of the early ecological studies 
fail to control for another more difficult problem. Variables like the prison population and 
police presence or resources are endogenous to crime rates. Assuming clearance rates 
stay the same, as crime rates increase, more people will go to prison simply because more 
crime is being committed. Likewise, as crime rates increase, governments are likely to 
commit more resources to the problem. Because these variables are influenced by each 
other, variance attributed to a deterrent effect may be better explained by this 
phenomenon. Several studies discussed later including Sampson and Cohen (1988), 
Levitt (1997), and Marvell and Moody (1996) make stronger attempts to control for this 
problem, and their evidence for deterrent effects should therefore be considered more 
compelling. 
The second category of ecological studies looks at police-based sanction 
variables. Where as the prison-based variables dealt with the deterrence through severity 
and certainty of punishment, research using police-based variables has primarily looked 
at variables that impact the certainty of punishment. The two major variables studied 
have been police resources and probability of apprehension. In 1974, Tittle and Rowe 
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examined Florida index crime rates and arrest probabilities across counties and 
municipalities. The study found negative associations between index crime rates and 
arrest probabilities over .3. This finding led Tittle and Rowe to conclude that certainty of 
arrest is not an effective deterrent mechanism for a community when 30% or less of 
reported crimes result in an arrest. 
Further research on the deterrent effect of certainty of punishment (in terms of 
probability of arrest) by Wilson and Boland (1978) clarified the relationship between 
police resources and deterrence. The study argued that changes in police resources have 
no direct deterrent effect because these resources are allocated through a bureaucratic 
process rather than at maximum efficiency. Instead, changes in police resources have an 
impact only when active enforcement exists. Wilson and Boland looked at 35 cities and 
examined the ratio of traffic offense arrests to traffic offenses as a measure of police 
aggressiveness. The study found that such an arrest ratio had a negative association with 
robberies, suggesting that police departments that aggressively enforce traffic violations 
(thereby increasing the certainty of punishment for such offenses) deter robberies. 
The crucial idea that comes out of Wilson and Boland is that police 
aggressiveness can impact arrest rates, which, in turn, create a deterrence effect. Sampson 
and Cohen (1988) applied this idea to Wilson’s theory of “Broken Windows” – that areas 
where minor crimes are condoned eventually breed more serious crimes. Sampson and 
Cohen studied 171 cities to determine if aggressive enforcement of minor crimes had 
indeed limited the amount of serious crimes relative to cities with more lax enforcement 
of minor crimes. Their study suggested that minor crime arrest rates are negatively 
associated with robbery crime rates. 
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The two most important recent studies done using police-based sanction variables 
have examined the question of whether police force size impacts crime rates. Research on 
police size impact on crime rates was virtually non-existent between 1978 and 1990, in 
large part due to the explication by Fisher and Nagin (1978) of the endogeniety problem. 
Levitt (1997) evades the problem by finding a change in police force size that cannot be 
attributed to crime rate changes. Levitt found that police forces increase on mayoral and 
gubernatorial election years, and after controlling for other factors, found that these 
police force increases are negatively associated with crime rates. Marvell and Moody 
(1996) found similar results using a Granger causality method whereby increases in 
police force were found to have negative association with future crime rates. Similar to 
the Marvell and Moody study, Corman and Mocan (2000) used data from New York City 
to examine the relationship between police size and crime rates on a monthly level while 
controlling for the endogenous relationship. The results of all three recent studies on the 
deterrent effect of police size were similar: a 10% increase in police size resulted in a 
10% decrease in crime rates. 
A review of the ecological study literature provides mixed evidence to support the 
theory of general deterrence, however, the evidence suggests that certainty of punishment 
in the form of higher arrest ratios (through aggressive policing and/or police force size) 
seems more likely than severity of punishment to produce a general deterrence effect. 
 
Deterrence Evidence in Interrupted Time-Series Studies 
The second body of research regarding general deterrence uses interrupted time-
series studies. As this study employs the same methodological approach, the evidence for 
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a general deterrence effect in interrupted time-series studies is of particular interest. 
Interrupted time-series studies examine two similar populations; the first population is 
subjected to a change in severity and/or certainty of a sanction, the second population 
remains the same. Evidence of a deterrence effect using this method requires a reduction 
in crime rates in the first population while no change in crime rates in the second 
population.  
The classic example of interrupted time-series work is Kelling et al. al. (1974) In 
the well-known study, five patrol beats in Kansas City had two or three cars on each beat, 
five patrol beats had no cars, and five patrol beats had only one car. While the study 
found no evidence to support the deterrent effect of police presence, the study is often 
criticized, and according to Levitt (2002), “most researchers view this (Kelling et al. al 
1974) experiment as inconclusive”. Despite the Kansas City study, findings in interrupted 
time-series studies have provided evidence suggesting policies that increase sanction 
properties have a deterrent effect, but that effect does not remain constant on a permanent 
basis.  
As discussed earlier, Ross (1982) studied changes in drunk-driving laws in Britain 
and Scandinavian countries where he observed a negative association between tougher 
sanction enforcement and drunken driving-related accident rates immediately after the 
implementation of such policies. However, those drunk driving-related accident rates 
eventually increased. Ross attributed the time-based change in deterrence effect to an 
initial overestimation of punishment risk followed by an eventual awareness of the 
absolute punishment risk. Ross (1982) estimated that the absolute risk for drunk driving 
was about 1 in 1000, and although that risk ratio was higher (2 in 1000) immediately after 
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implementation of tougher sanctions (and related enforcement) the risk ratio was still low 
enough so as to exert limited real risk of punishment on offenders.  
In Sherman’s survey of police crackdowns (1990) he finds the same decay of 
deterrence effect, and while agreeing with Ross’ conclusions about cause, also provides 
an alternative explanation. Sherman suggests that the initial deterrence effect produced by 
a change in sanction properties derives from a wide deviation in potential offenders’ 
perception of risk of punishment. Over time, the deviation (or uncertainty) lessens, and 
potential offenders have a clearer understanding of the punishment risk associated with 
the crime. According to Sherman, the uncertainty of punishment risk generated in an 
initial deterrent effect is related to how effectively police can increase the perceived 
certainty of punishment. Given that police attempts to improve certainty of punishment 
impose resource costs, police are unable to permanently sustain the level of enforcement 
necessary to keep the likelihood of arrest at the level that produced the initial deterrence 
effect. As the level of enforcement drops, the likelihood of arrest drops, thereby 
decreasing punishment risk uncertainty for potential offenders. Depending on the 
situation, a residual deterrence effect may remain for a limited period (although weaker 
than the initial deterrence effect) after the level of enforcement has dropped from the 
level required to produce the initial deterrent effect.  
For a policy to minimize the initial deterrence decay, and sustain a deterrent 
effect, enforcement must be intermittent rather than constant. If done frequently enough, 
variation in the level of enforcement will sustain the uncertainty of punishment risk that 
creates the initial deterrence effect, without imposing the additional cost of a constant 
enforcement increase.  
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Deterrence Evidence in Perceptual Studies 
  For a policy to truly deter an individual, he or she must believe that their 
punishment risk has increased to a level where criminal activity no longer becomes 
profitable. The area of perceptual deterrence literature examines the levels of punishment 
risk an individual believes exist when deciding to engage in a particular crime.  As David 
Kennedy notes, (1997A) “it is fairly common for offenders to be ignorant of criminal 
justice policy and practice.” Indeed, the most significant finding in perceptual deterrence 
studies (see Nagin and Paternoster 1993, 1994 {theft}, Paternoster and Simpson 1997 
{corporate crime}, and Klepper and Nagin 1989A, 1989B {tax evasion}) is that 
individuals who have prior offending records seem to perceive lower punishment risks 
than individuals who have no prior records. A variety of theories exist to explain this 
phenomenon, however, little empirical proof exists to support any theory. The most 
popular explanation is put forth in the series of studies cited above. As individuals 
successfully commit crimes without apprehension, their internalized probability of 
punishment reduces. Therefore, prior offenders would have lower punishment risk 
perceptions than non-offenders. While this explanation is the most popular among 
competing theories, no strong evidence exists to explain the phenomenon. 
 Another relevant area of study within the perceptual deterrence literature is the 
perceived punishment risk associated with informal punishment sources after the 
imposition of formal punishments. The idea that an individual may be deterred from 
crime not only by the formal punishment response from the criminal justice system, but 
also from society at large for being a “criminal” has been hypothesized for a long time. 
Tittle (1968), Zimring and Hawkins (1973), Andaenes (1974), Gibbs (1975), and 
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Blumstein and Nagin (1976) all conceived of the power of societal forces as a deterrent to 
criminal behavior. Evidence for this phenomenon can be found in tax evasion studies by 
Klepper and Nagin (1989A, 1989B), where they found that individuals were more likely 
to evade tax payments when the enforcement mechanism was private rather than public. 
They suggest that when the enforcement mechanism becomes public, an additional cost 
of violating tax laws is added in the form of damage to reputation. When the enforcement 
mechanism is purely private, individuals only risk their money. Clearly, the potential 
damage of an individual’s integrity in society acted as a deterrent effect above and 
beyond the monetary punishment of the formal sanctions. This concept is critical in 
Ceasefire, where an assumption exists that gang members will use informal sanction 
power in the form of “peer pressure” to prevent other members in their gang from 
committing homicides for fear of  a collective retaliation against the gang by law 
enforcement (in the form of an enforcement action). 
 Nagin (1998) issues a caveat to this phenomenon, however. In order for an 
individual to perceive informal sanctions from society after a formal sanction, the 
criminal act for which the individual was formally sanctioned cannot be commonplace in 
society. As the experience of punishment becomes more commonplace in society (i.e. the 
number of individuals in society experiencing punishment increases) the social stigma 
attached to the crime decreases simply because a larger portion of the population has also 
committed the crime, and is therefore unlikely to stigmatize future offenders. The 
significance of Nagin’s argument is realized in policy options where informal sanctions 
are utilized to produce a deterrent effect. Fortunately, homicide remains a rare event, and 
hypothetically some stigma still attaches even among gang members. 
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Literature Review Findings 
Certainly, evidence exists to support deterrence theory from a Specific or General 
Deterrence perspective. This literature provides a variety of lessons that are relevant to 
Ceasefire. Clearly, certainty of the punishment threat matters a great deal, even more than 
the severity of the threat. Deterrence is a phenomenon that is time-sensitive and is subject 
to decay. As it is a largely internalized process by the potential offender, deterrence is 
subject to the offenders’ perceptions of risk and severity, and that perception is 
influenced by past experience and police behavior. However, one of the most important 
pieces of Ceasefire, collective deterrence of groups, is largely unaccounted for by 
existing deterrence literature. 
 
Focused Deterrence 
Kennedy notes (2003) “deterrence…is the principal mechanism through which 
the central feature of criminal justice, the exercise of state authority, works- it is hoped- 
to diminish offending and enhance public safety”. In the Criminal Justice system, the 
mechanism of deterrence is almost exclusively employed on an individual level, and for 
good reason- the Criminal Justice system functions though an individual case processing 
model. An incident occurs, a suspect is charged with a crime, the suspect is tried, and the 
suspect is disposed. A punishment given to a suspect has two deterrence functions, to 
deter that suspect from further offending, and to serve as an example to others of the 
punishment they would receive from committing the same offense. This focus is for good 
reason- As Kennedy (2003) put it, “a gang, after all, does not pull a trigger; some person 
does. A fraternity does not commit date rape, a person does”. 
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An individual focus, however, fails to account for the context in which the 
individual offending is occurring. The context of youth violence in Boston was one of 
disputes fueled by alliances and beefs among 61 active gangs (Kennedy, 2003). 
Inevitably, individual offending behavior of those gang members was influenced partially 
by the gang’s collective norms. As the individual behavior is a function of set of given 
norms, attempts to alter the individual behavior must also address the norms from which 
the behavior derives. 
In contrast to the typical individual-only approach, the deterrent effect observed in 
Ceasefire appears to deter by addressing both the individual behavior and the social 
dynamic that influences it. This “Focused Deterrence” effect is what sets Ceasefire apart 
from other deterrence-based crime policy.  This is, in effect, two layers of deterrence 
working in cooperation to address both individual behavior and group norms. In 
Ceasefire, an enforcement action commences against a group when someone in that 
group has been involved in a homicide. While such violent behavior may not be palatable 
to all group members on an individual level, the collective norms of the group have either 
condoned or failed to disapprove such violence. Until those group norms change, the 
group will continue to collectively condone violence, shaping the behavior of its’ 
members. The group-focused enforcement action acts not only a punishment for 
individual and group deviance from societal norms regarding violence, but as an example 
meant to deter others. 
Deterrence is generated through the call-in, where the consequences of homicide 
involvement are communicated to members of other groups. The examples of other 
groups that have been subject to enforcement actions as a result of their collective 
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involvement in a homicide serve to deter on two levels: first, that the individual’s actions 
have repercussions for the group, and second, that the group’s lack of collective control 
over the behavior of its’ members can have negative repercussions for everyone in the 
group. 
The “Focused Deterrence” approach has substantial appeal from a policy 
perspective. Deterrence literature indicates that perceptions of punishment severity and 
risk vary substantially from person to person, and prior criminals tend to have a fairly 
realistic assessment of their actual levels (i.e. low risk of capture, and weak 
punishments). For criminals then, broad threats of punishment have little credibility, and 
they are less likely to be deterred than non-criminals. Groups and group members 
targeted by Ceasefire are likely to possess these perceptions, as most have frequent 
contact with the criminal justice system, often for drug dealing. “Focused Deterrence” 
compensates for these deterrence flaws in several ways.  
For offenders engaged in criminality like drug sales, the perceived risk of 
punishment inherent in criminality is low. For each transaction that results in arrest, many 
more result in no punishment. Over time, experiences like this with the criminal justice 
system give unclear, even misleading signals to offenders. Ceasefire corrects this 
ambiguity with a clearly defined “line in the sand” that will produce punishment: 
someone in the group committing a homicide.  
Of course, a “line in the sand” for behavior is only meaningful if the potential 
offenders see the punishment threat as credible. Too often the breadth and magnitude of 
the criminal justice system makes following up threats impractical- too many cases with 
too many different circumstances to dish out the same punishment every time for an 
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offense. The clearly defined circumstances of Ceasefire allow credibility to be eventually 
built- If a homicide occurs and your group is involved, law enforcement will give special 
attention to all the members of your group that are involved in illegal activity. This 
punishment threat is one that law enforcement can actually follow through on- a limited 
number of events (group-involved homicides) and a narrowly defined target (members of 
said group that are engaged in criminal activity). 
A secondary element of credible “Focused Deterrence” is adequately severe 
punishment. Just as prior offenders tend to have a low perception of punishment risk due 
to their experience with the criminal justice system, they also know that punishments are 
often hardly severe. The regular consequences for offenses that they regularly are 
arrested for will not serve to alter individual and group norms about violence. Instead, 
sophisticated and aggressive approaches such as use of federal law enforcement, 
cooperative patrolling with outside agencies, surveillance of activities, undercover 
narcotics operations, wiretaps, and conspiracy cases may be necessary. On the 
prosecution side, specialized attention including special prosecutors and limitations on 
plea bargains may be appropriate. 
Deterrence is a concept that has no meaning without a context. Specific and 
General Deterrence illustrate the two ways which individual behavior can be deterred. 
For so long deterrence has been defined in simply these contexts, without regard to the 
social dynamics upon which individual behaviors are dependent. The context of “Focused 
Deterrence” whereby changes in punishment and punishment threats are intended to 
modify not only individual behavior, but also group norms, represents an important 
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The Ceasefire program was implemented in response to a clear problem- violence 
in the City of Rochester, particularly homicide. The program is specifically tailored to 
address an important characteristic of Rochester’s homicide problem: group-related 
homicides of Black men 15 to 30 (Klofas et al, 2001). Ceasefire is intended to 
incapacitate groups that are involved in homicides, and deter other groups from 
committing homicides. The goal of any evaluation research is to assess whether or not a 
program has achieved its’ intended effect. In this research, the author attempts to 
ascertain whether the implementation of Ceasefire has produced decreases in violent 
crime, particularly in the areas for which the program is intended. 
 
Outcome Measures: Individual vs. Aggregate 
Programs such as Ceasefire are often implemented in response to rapid increases 
of a particular crime. These “spikes” place tremendous pressure on decision-makers from 
communities to respond immediately with a specialized plan to address the problem (i.e. 
“not business as usual”). Clearly, programs such as this have clear and limited goals: 
reduce the crime problem. Simple program goals would seem to make evaluations easy. 
Unfortunately, the timeframe of implementation makes the creation of appropriate 
research designs difficult. Instead, proof of success typically comes in output measures: 
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arrests made, grand jury referrals made, corners cleared, warrants served, amounts of 
drugs, guns, or money seized. These measures are readily accessible and demonstrate to 
the community that the criminal justice system has responded to the problem with 
additional special activity. These output statistics however, fail to speak to the outcomes 
desired and produced by the program- i.e. has the crime level of concern decreased, and 
is this decrease attributable to the implementation of the program? 
Clearly, evaluation of the Ceasefire program requires the analysis of outcome 
measures. Outcome measures for evaluating Ceasefire could take two forms. The first 
would be from an individual offending perspective- has the person stopped offending 
after going to the call-in? Such an approach feels natural in criminal justice: crimes have 
a victim and an offender, so crime reduction starts at apprehending and punishing the 
offender. It logically follows that when evaluating a program, you might implement a 
controlled randomized experiment, comparing the offending of people who have attended 
a “call-in” (the treatment group) to a control group to see if levels of offending in the 
treatment group have decreased more than the control group. An evaluation of this type 
would be a strong research methodology for assessing changes in individual offending 
levels, (and may provide insight into Ceasefire’s effects on group norms) but it fails to 
address the primary research goal of the evaluation- Comparative offending tells us 
nothing about changes in levels of aggregate crime.  
The concept behind Ceasefire suggests that the deliverance of a focused 
deterrence message to violent groups using “messengers” ought to deter more group 
members than simply the messenger. As group-related violence accounts for a significant 
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portion of all violence, we should expect to see decreases in aggregate levels of violence 
if Ceasefire were to have an effect. Therefore, the second type of outcome variable to 
consider for evaluation would be aggregate counts of crime over a period of time. 
 
Research Design 
 As the goal of Ceasefire is to decrease aggregate levels of violence (both overall 
and in the M/B/15-30 demographic), then the outcome variables to study must be of an 
aggregate nature, in this case, counts of crime in a timeframe. For this type of research, 
two designs are good options: simple interrupted time-series analysis and randomized 
controlled experiments. In this instance, a randomized controlled experiment is an 
optimal methodology, but due to practical and political limitations associated with 
implementation, the author has chosen the alternatively acceptable simple interrupted 
time-series method. 
 
Strengths of Randomized Controlled Experiments 
 The primary strength of this approach is the use of treatment and control groups to 
isolate the effects of the treatment (in this case the Ceasefire program) from other factors. 
For an evaluation of Ceasefire, a randomized controlled experiment would separate all of 
the violent gangs in Rochester into two groups: one group of gangs would be subject to 
the program (including call-ins and enforcement actions) and another group of gangs 
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would not be subject to the program. If the treatment and control groups are indeed 
similar in nature, then change observed in the treatment group that is not observed in the 
control group can be directly attributable to the treatment. In other words, the control 
group accounts for the impact of intervening variables. 
 
Weaknesses of Randomized Controlled Experiments 
Unfortunately, the great strength of Randomized Controlled Experiments are also 
their weakness when it comes to implementation. A successful research design of this 
nature requires pre-planning before the treatment (the Ceasefire program) is 
implemented. For example, the first step in such an experiment would be to divide 
Rochester gangs into a treatment and a control group before implementing Ceasefire. 
This sorting process did not occur prior to the implementation in Rochester. At the time 
of implementation, evaluation research design was not a consideration, and therefore, this 
research design was not an option after implementation had occurred. 
If a randomized experiment methodology were planned for this evaluation, it 
would have been fraught with problems. Ideally, gangs would be evenly distributed 
between the control and treatment groups in terms of gang violence propensity, with each 
group having a similar range of violent and non-violent gangs. Some gangs are easy to 
classify, as they maintain a persistent level of violence (or lack thereof, simply sticking to 
drug sales), most groups, however, “flare up” and “cool down” over time. Any results, 
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therefore, of a randomized experiment would likely be skewed by imbalance in the levels 
of violence between the control and treatment group.  
Additionally, the notion of selectively implementing a gang violence program 
may be unpalatable for the decision makers investing both political capital and agency 
resources in the effort. The selective implementation could also conceivably hinder the 
effectiveness of the program, especially considering the deterrence message is based 
upon consequences related to group-related homicide. If, over time, it becomes clear that 
only certain gangs (that are subject to the Ceasefire program) will face repercussions as 
the result of their involvement in a homicide, while other gangs (that are not subject to 
Ceasefire), face no repercussions, the credibility of the deterrence message for the gangs 
in the treatment group will inevitably decrease, thereby reducing the likelihood of the 
program having an effect.   
 
Interrupted Time-Series Analysis 
The most direct and appropriate approach to assessing Ceasefire is to conduct an 
interrupted time-series analysis. Typically, program evaluations of this nature use an 
interrupted time-series research design (Cook, 1979). The null hypothesis of this research 
design is simple- no difference in the time series is evident when comparing the period 
before the implementation of a program to the period after the implementation has 
occurred. Therefore, one would hope to disprove this null hypothesis in favor of showing 
a difference between the two periods. This difference provides evidence that the program 
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may have had an effect on the time series. The benefit of interrupted time-series analysis 
for this evaluation is that is lacks the grouping selection problems that make a 
randomized experiment difficult in this situation. This design is very easy to implement, 
and the data necessary to complete it is readily available. 
 
Weaknesses of Interrupted Time-Series Design 
 There are several weaknesses to interrupted time-series design for this evaluation. 
The first shortcoming of a time-series approach to analyzing this data is the length of the 
dataset. A common “rule of thumb” for time-series analysis is to have a minimum of 50 
observations (Cook, 1979). This minimum is necessary to assess correlated error in the 
time-series. This dataset includes 60 observations, 15 of which are in the post-test period. 
The issue of a minimum number of observations is clearly a weakness in this case, as the 
number of observations in this data is very close to the minimum. This issue is of 
particular concern, as the need to lag the intervention variable (to test for program effect), 
will further reduce the number of observations. 
As just noted, another weakness of Interrupted Time-Series Design is that of the 
placement of the break point in the time series. The placement of the break point is 
critical; effects can be minimized because a break point was placed too early or late in the 
time series, relative to the time at which the actual implementation of the program 
occurred. Placement of the break point is not always as simple as identifying the date 
when the program was implemented. The effect of a program can lag and/or anticipate 
any actual “start date” of a program. In other words, the effect of the program does not 
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necessarily begin when the program starts. Braga et al. note “Implementation lags in 
policy interventions make it very difficult to say that a particular date defines the break 
between the pre-program and post-program periods, even when the implementation date 
is known” (Braga et al., 2003). Anticipatory effects are extremely unlikely to have 
occurred in this instance because the program was not made public prior to their 
implementation. Instead, one can plausibly envision lagged effects; the dissemination of 
the focused deterrence message takes time to diffuse into the targeted population, and 
therefore, it is unlikely that the program is in full effect on October 2003, the date of the 
first call-in.  
In the case of this analysis, the first call-in for Ceasefire occurred on October 3, 
2003. Given that the unit of analysis will be monthly counts, the break point is October 
2003. The date is not perfect, however, due to the inexact nature of program effects. In 
Braga et al, “Testing for Structural Breaks in the Evaluation of Programs” (2003), A 
structural breaks methodology was applied to the Boston homicide time series to identify 
the optimal location of the break, thereby inferentially accounting for any lag. While this 
study does not use this methodology, it is of note that the 2003 study found the optimal 
break point (the break point where program effect became apparent) to be June 1996, 
whereas the 1998 interrupted time-series design used a break point of May 15, 1996- The 
day of the first call-in in Boston. Because of the uncertainty around when program effect 
actually begins to occur, this study will examine not only the October 2003 breakpoint, 
but also a variety of lagged intervention breakpoints. 
Another issue involving interrupted time-series design is that of alternative 
program impact. In any given jurisdiction around the country, a variety of initiatives may 
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be in place at any one time. A researcher evaluating the impact of a program must 
identify the (if any) programs in operation at the same time as the program of interest. 
After identifying competing programs, one must determine if these programs could have 
impacts that might account for impacts observed in the evaluation of the program of 
interest. In some cases, the presence of such programs may need to be accounted for in 
the analytical model. In the case of Rochester, one significant program has 
simultaneously co-existed with Ceasefire.  
Project IMPACT was a program that ran intermittently from April 2004 through 
October 2004. The program consisted of co-operative joint tactical patrols between the 
Rochester Police Department, the Monroe County Sheriff’s office, and the New York 
State Police. These tactical patrols focused on violence “hotspots” in the city, most of 
which are areas where gangs are active. When in action, these patrols drastically changed 
the active “force size” of officers on the road, adding as many as 80 additional officers. 
While the goal of this program was roughly in line with that of Ceasefire (violence 
reduction), the means were drastically different. The IMPACT patrols focused on heavy 
patrol-type activities including clearing corners where drug dealing was suspected, traffic 
checkpoints, and bike patrols. If this change in patrol behavior were to affect change in 
levels of violence, it would likely be due to the incapacitation effects produced by the 
patrol’s arrests. Due to the intermitted nature of the patrol, a simple proxy variable is 
insufficient to assess the potential impacts of the IMPACT patrol on violence. The author 
has attempted to examine the effects of the patrol on violent crime through its output 
products (felony and misdemeanor arrests) to determine if changes in arrests are 
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associated with reductions in violence. To account for potential lag effects of mass 
arrests, the author has also examined the monthly counts of criminals sent to state prison.  
The last major issue of concern, stochastic error, is perhaps the most important. 
There are two processes that exert influence over time-series data, deterministic and 
stochastic. The deterministic component of a time-series is normally distributed, 
independent of error forces, and can be somewhat reliably predicted. The deterministic 
component of time-series data contains the information needed to assess, for instance, 
program impact. The other part of the time series, the stochastic component, deals with 
sources of error in the time-series. By convention, these sources of error are collectively 
called “noise”, but this “noise” has three distinct sources. These noise sources must be 
adequately controlled for in interrupted time-series analyses in order to get only the 
impact of the program.  
The first source of noise in a time-series is a trend. Over time, chronological data 
tend to exhibit a generally linear pattern up or down. In most cases, trend is easily 
discerned through visual inspection; however, in data sets of short duration or high 
variability, trend may be difficult to see. As a describable systematic source of error, 
trend can be controlled for in an interrupted time-series analysis. 
The second noise source comes from the effects of seasonality. In general, 
property crime and violent crime peak in opposite times of the year; property crime 
spikes in the winter, while violent crime problems are at their apex in the summer 
months. These seasonal patterns repeat themselves every year (to varying degree) and 
despite their annual repetition, are often misunderstood by criminal justice policy-makers 
as a sign that, come October, they really have been doing something right to combat 
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violent crime. Like trend, seasonality has a systematic structure that can be accounted for 
in statistical analysis. 
The last source of noise in a time series is completely random. If you control for trend 
and seasonality in a time-series, you still inevitably get a normally distributed series of 
random shocks in the data. While the errors should follow a normal distribution, they are 
unsystematic, and have no structure that can be integrated into a model for analysis. 
Instead, random error is compensated for using statistical methods. 
The author used autocorrelation frequency plots to assess the structure of noise in 
the dependent variables of this dataset. This tool was unable to adequately diagnose a 
noise structure that ARIMA modeling can control for. That ACF plots did not show a 
clear stochastic noise structure does not necessarily mean those structures do not exist in 
the dataset, especially considering the dataset’s limited number of observations. In lieu of 
ARIMA modeling, we have included two independent variables in the dataset, a simple 




 To conduct this analysis, the author will use variety of tools of use in an 
interrupted time-series analysis. First, a simple pre-test post-test comparison is employed 
to examine basic changes in the level of homicide during the intervention period. The 
next level of analysis involves t-testing of the pre-test and post-test dependent variable 
means using the intervention variable and the lagged intervention variables. The final two 
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steps of the analysis involve performing a correlation matrix to inform variable selection 
for a multiple regression analysis. 
 
Dependent Variables 
Clearly, homicide in general and in the M/B/15-30 demographic are the prime 
variables where program effect would occur, but several other variables are also worth 
examining. If groups are successfully being deterred from committing homicides, they 
are receiving and understanding the message communicated at the call-in- if someone in 
your group commits a homicide, the whole group gets special attention. For the message 
to have success, violence-conducive behavior would have to be altered, particularly gun 
carrying and trigger-pulling. It seems likely that crimes involving similar behaviors as 
homicides- other gun-related violence- could decrease as a result of a successful 
Ceasefire program. Therefore, the author has obtained over five years of monthly counts 
(2000- partial 2005) of victims2 of the following crimes from the records management 
system of the Rochester Police Department: Homicide, Homicide of Black Male 15-30 
(M/B/15-30), Gun Assault 1st Degree3, Gun Assault 1st Degree of M/B/15-30, Gun 




                                                 
2 An inevitable disconnect exists when examining crimes- should the unit of analysis be the incident or the 
victim? When counting homicides, however, victims rather than incidents are counted, by convention. We 
will also, therefore, count victims of gun assaults and gun robberies for analysis purposes. 
3 As defined in NYS Penal Law, Title H, Article 120.10 
4 As defined in NYS Penal Law, Title H, Article 160.15 
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Independent Variables 
The independent variables used in this evaluation fall into two categories: 
intervention variables and alternative explanatory variables. In addition to the basic 
intervention dummy variable (which runs 15 months from October 2003 to December 
2004), the author will examine dummy variables lagged from one to four months to 
account for the uncertainty of when Ceasefire actually began to take effect. 
The alternative explanatory variables are proxies for a wide variety of 
phenomenon that could have impact upon the dependent variables. As previously noted, 
monthly mean temperature serves as a proxy for seasonal variation and a simple linear 
trend variable represents the possibility of a broad linear trend in the dataset. The 
monthly unemployment rate acts as a proxy for the influence of economic conditions on 
violent crime, and monthly counts of felony arrests , misdemeanor arrests, and state 
prison convictions are meant to account for changes in policing behavior, specifically, the 
IMPACT patrols of summer 2004. 
 
Hypothesis 
 The Ceasefire program attempts to reduce homicide in two ways: incapacitation 
of groups who engage in homicide, and deterrence of groups who have the potential to 
commit homicide. A group, rather than individual, focus is a prudent approach if the 
following assumption- groups and group members are involved in many of the total 
number of homicides each year- is true. Unfortunately, this supposition is difficult to 
conclusively assess in the instance of Rochester. Prior to the implementation, no up-to-
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date intelligence was routinely captured and analyzed, so it is impossible to say, prior to 
the implementation of Ceasefire, how many homicides truly involved groups or group 
members.  
We must rely on proxy measures, for instance, victimization levels in the M/B/15-
30 demographic. From 2000-2003, this “high-risk” demographic accounted for 45% of 
all homicide victims (N=179), and 56% of all known homicide suspects (N=109) in 
Rochester. Of the over 700 gang members now in the Rochester Police Department’s 
gang database, 86% are Black Males, ages 15-30. Prior research also indicates that group 
involvement is a key characteristic of youth violence (Zimring, 1998). Clearly, this 
demographic is disproportionately at risk for engagement in violence in the city of 
Rochester. If the assumption of group involvement is true, it is reasonable to believe that 
the Ceasefire program could have powerful incapacitation effects and broad deterrent 
effect causing declines in homicide within the target demographic5, and by extension, in 
all demographics. Additionally, if homicides decline, it is reasonable to assume crimes 
that look similar in nature to homicides- severe gun assaults and robberies- would also 
decline, as the Ceasefire program is really deterring violent behaviors among groups. 
The author, therefore, hypothesizes that a causal negative relationship exists 
between the Ceasefire intervention and all six dependent variables (Homicides, Gun 
Assaults and Gun Robberies in both the M/B/15-30 demographic and among all victims). 
                                                 
5 It is important to note that the Ceasefire program draws no racial distinction in enforcement actions or 
call-ins. All members of a group, regardless of race or ethnicity, are candidates for a call-in, or if their 
group is involved in a homicide, an enforcement action. The M/B/15-30 is used for evaluation purposes 
because blacks are disproportionately represented in victimization, offending, and gang involvement 
relative to other races. The demographic then serves as a particularly tight measure from which to observe 
the potential impacts of a highly focused initiative. 
 52
Using the tools mentioned earlier, the author seeks to disprove the following null 
hypotheses: 
For t-tests:  
Ho: µ(pre-test) = µ(post-test) 
Ha: µ(pre-test) ≠ µ(post-test) 
 
For multiple regression analysis: 
Ho: β(dependent) = 0 
Ha: β(dependent) ≠ 0 
 
Definitions 
ALL ASS: Total monthly counts of Assault 1st victims in which a gun was used during 
the event. (DEPENDENT) 
 
ALL HOM: Total monthly counts of homicide victims. (DEPENDENT) 
 
ALL ROB: Total monthly counts of Robbery 1st victims in which a gun was used during 
the event. (DEPENDENT) 
 
FELONYAR: Monthly counts of felony arrests made by the Rochester Police 
Department in Rochester, NY. (INDEPENDENT) 
 
INT: A dummy variable representing the Ceasefire intervention, a value of 1 indicates 
the presence of the intervention. In this variable, the Ceasefire intervention runs 15 
months from October, 2003 to December, 2004. (INDEPENDENT) 
 
LAGS (INT_1): A dummy variable representing the Ceasefire intervention, a value of 1 
indicates the presence of the intervention. This variable is lagged 1 month, making the 




LAGS (INT_2): A dummy variable representing the Ceasefire intervention, a value of 1 
indicates the presence of the intervention. This variable is lagged 2 months, making the 
Ceasefire intervention run 13 months from December, 2003 to December, 2004. 
(INDEPENDENT) 
 
LAGS (INT_3): A dummy variable representing the Ceasefire intervention, a value of 1 
indicates the presence of the intervention. This variable is lagged 3 months, making the 
Ceasefire intervention run 12 months from January, 2004 to December, 2004. 
(INDEPENDENT) 
 
LAGS (INT_4): A dummy variable representing the Ceasefire intervention, a value of 1 
indicates the presence of the intervention. This variable is lagged 4 months, making the 
Ceasefire intervention run 11 months from February, 2004 to December, 2004. 
(INDEPENDENT) 
 
MB HOM: Monthly counts of Black Male homicide victims ages 15-30 in the city of 
Rochester, NY. (DEPENDENT) 
 
MB ROB: Total monthly counts of Black Male Robbery 1st victims, ages 15-30, in 
which a gun was used during the event. (DEPENDENT) 
 
MB ASS: Total monthly counts of Black Male Assault 1st victims, ages 15-30, in which a 
gun was used during the event. (DEPENDENT) 
 
MEANTEMP: Monthly mean temperature values in Rochester, NY. (INDEPENDENT) 
 
MISDARR: Monthly counts of felony arrests made by the Rochester Police Department 
in Rochester, NY. (INDEPENDENT) 
 
STATEPRI: Monthly counts of state prison sentences issued in Monroe County, NY. 
(INDEPENDENT) 
 
TREND: Simple equal interval linear trend variable, running from .08 to 5 in 
chronological order. (INDEPENDENT) 
 








Results and Findings 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
This analysis assumes normal distributions of the six dependent variables. 
Although several variables exhibit signs of positive skewing6, the data appear to be 
roughly normal. Indeed, a Poisson distribution may be most appropriate for this data set, 
however, the analytical tools associated with this distribution are beyond the purview of 
this analysis. See Braga et al. (2001) for advanced methods assuming a Poisson 
distribution with data similar to that being examined in this evaluation. 
 
Pre-Test Post-Test Analysis 
 The length of the dataset for all variables is 60 cases. The data is organized by 
monthly counts starting from January 2000 and ending in December 2004. The first 
Ceasefire call-in occurred in October 2003, marking the official start of the program and 
post-test period. The pre-test period, January 2000 to September 2003, covers 45 months. 
The post-test period, October 2003 to December 2004, covers 15 months. The table 
below shows the monthly means for the pre and post-test periods of each dependent 
variable.  
                                                 
6 See Exhibit I of Appendix for Descriptive Statistics and Histograms. 
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MB_HOM 1.71 1.00 -41.56% 
ALL_HOM 3.64 3.40 -6.71% 
MB_ASS 1.96 1.80 -7.95% 
ALL_ASS 3.22 3.27 1.38% 
MB_ROB 9.02 7.80 -13.55% 
ALL_ROB 41.13 50.93 23.82% 
Overall, there seems to be a modest decline in the mean number of monthly 
homicide victims during the post-test period, but a rise in mean monthly victims of 1st 
degree gun assaults and 1st degree gun robberies.  In the M/B/15-30 demographic, 
decreases are evident in homicide, gun assaults and gun robberies during the post-test 
period. The decrease within homicide is particularly large, in both percentage and real 
terms, when you consider the relative infrequency of the event within the context of the 
temporal scale of analysis (month). The difference in direction of the percentage changes 
when comparing the M/B/15-30 means to the total victimization means suggests that a 
change in victimization level among the M/B/15-30 demographic may have been 
occurring that was not occurring in other demographics. 
As discussed in Chapter III, there is reason to believe that the full deterrent effect 
of Ceasefire may have lagged behind its implementation date of October 2003. Indeed, a 
distinct natural break occurs in the monthly counts of M/B/15-30 homicide victims as of 
January 2004. From January 2004 to April 2004, no M/B/15-30 homicides occurred. No 
similar stretch of four months without a M/B/15-30 homicide exists within the dataset. If 
a three-month lag occurred and actual program effects began to become evident in 









MB_HOM 15 22 15 31 21 9 -56.6% 
ALL_HOM 40 41 41 57 45 36 -19.6% 
MB_ASS 22 21 30 21 24 21 -10.6% 
ALL_ASS 28 42 38 44 38 42 10.5% 
MB_ROB 114 112 98 120 111 79 -28.8% 
ALL_ROB 490 479 480 626 519 540 4.1% 
The above table provides yearly counts for the six dependent variables. The column “00-
03 Average”, is analogous to a pre-test mean if we assume a three-month lag in program 
effect. 2004 essentially is the post-test period. This version of the pre-test post-test 
analysis yields essentially similar results to the initial analysis- a modest decrease in total 
homicides during the post-test period and small increases in both gun assaults and gun 
robberies. Likewise, the M/B/15-30 demographic shows a large decrease in homicide and 
modest decreases in gun assaults and robberies during the post-test period. 
 
T-Tests 
 Given that the basic pre-test post-test analysis indicated some differences in the 
pre and post-test means of the dependent variables, the next step of the analysis was to 
assess the statistical significance of these differences. To do this, independent sample T-
Tests were conducted on all six dependent variables, using the intervention dummy 
variable to group pre-test and post-test data. To examine the potential for program effect 
lag, T-tests were also run by groupings according to four separate lagged intervention 
variables, which lagged from one through four months. All statistics examined assumed 
no equal variance between the pre and post-test groups. 
 57
The initial T-test of the original intervention variable (see Figure C in appendix) 
showed one statistically significant difference between the pre-test and post-test means. 
During the intervention period, total gun robberies increased by an average of 9.8 per 
month. After lagging the intervention one month, t-tests indicate a statistically significant 
average decline of .83 M/B/15-30 homicides per month during the intervention period. 
No other statistically significant differences in means were observed during the one-
month lag t-tests. 
 The t-tests performed using a two month lagged intervention variable for 
grouping showed no statistically significant results, although MB HOM was very close 
(.059) to showing a .83 decrease in monthly homicides. When performed with the three-
month lagged intervention variable, a statistically significant average reduction of 1.03 
M/B/15-30 homicides per month was evident in the MB HOM variable during the 
intervention period. No additional differences in means of significance existed. The last 
set of t-tests, grouped by the four-month lagged intervention variable exhibited two 
statistically significant changes in mean during the intervention period. MB HOM 
decreased by an average of .89 homicides per month during the intervention period, and 
MB ROB decreased by an average of 3.19 gun robberies per month. 
 The t-tests indicate several important points- that no statistically significant 
decrease in level of total gun assault, gun robbery, or homicide occurred after the 
implementation of Ceasefire, regardless of when potential effects may have begun to take 
effect. Therefore, if the Ceasefire program were to have had impact on overall incidents 
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of gun assaults, gun robberies, and homicides, these impacts were limited at best, and 
most likely, negligible.  
In the “high-risk” M/B/15-30 demographic, however, there was persistent 
evidence of a significant decline in the number of monthly homicides after lagging the 
intervention one month. The peak of statistically significant declines occurred during the 
third month lag, yet another variable, MB ROB showed a statistically significant decline 
with MB HOM when t-tests were run using the four-month lagged intervention variable. 
All together, the t-tests suggest that if Ceasefire had impact, it happened in and only in 
the desired “key demographic”, and that some program effect lag may have occurred. 
What t-test analysis fails to account for is the influence of additional factors. 
 
Correlation Matrix 
 As discussed in Chapter III, the author selected a variety of independent variables 
that hypothetically might influence the dependent variables in this analysis. A correlation 
analysis using Pearson’s r was performed to assess whether relationships do exist 
between the independent and dependent variables, and to examine the nature and strength 
of those relationships. Of primary interest was evidence of negative correlations between 
any of the dependent variables and any of the five intervention variables. Such evidence 
furthers the possibility of disproving the null hypotheses of this experiment (i.e. that the 
Ceasefire intervention had no effect on our dependent variables), and informs the next 
step of the analysis, namely, which dependent variables are worth examining through 
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multiple regression, and which independent variables ought to be included in those 
regression models. 
 Three of the dependent variables, ALL HOM, MB ASS, and ALL ASS, exhibited 
no signs of statistically significant correlation with any of the five intervention variables, 
nor any correlation approaching statistical significance.  As the relationships between 
these dependent variables and the intervention variables do not seem to be statistically 
significant, they were excluded from further analysis.  
 ALL ROB was the only dependent variable to correlate to the original 
intervention variable, INT, at a weak7, but statistically significant, level. At r=.303, the 
direction of the correlation is opposite of what would be expected had the Ceasefire 
program been successful at reducing gun robberies. Instead, increases in gun robberies 
seem to be weakly related to the intervention period. This relationship may be the result 
of a collinearity problem, explained by a temporal pattern inherent in the ALL ROB 
variable. Both ALL ROB and INT are positively correlated to TREND at statistically 
significant levels. The strength of the relationship between ALL ROB and TREND is low 
(r=.300), but the relationship between TREND AND INT is high (r=.734). Because the 
intervention occurred in the temporal end of the dataset, the possibility exists that the 
relationship between ALL ROB and INT could be the result of the influence TREND 
exerts on both variables. If the relationship were spurious, we might expect to see a 
similar dynamic in the relationships between ALL ROB and the other intervention 
variables. While there are high levels of correlation between the other intervention 
                                                 
7 By social science convention, strength of correlation is defined by quintile ranges and their accompanying 
descriptors: very weak (r=00-.29), weak (r=.30-.49), moderate (r=.50-.69), strong (r=.70-.89), and very 
strong (r=.90-1.00). 
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variables and TREND, there are no statistically significant relationships between ALL 
ROB and the other intervention variables. Even though the relationships lack 
significance, the change in direction and strength of the relationships is worth noting. 
When examining the non-significant relationships between ALL ROB and the lagged 
intervention variables, a pattern of decline is evident. From LAGS (INT_1) to LAGS 
(INT_3), the already weak positive relationship with ALL ROB decreases, until the 
relationship between ALL ROB and LAGS (INT_4) is negative and weak. The author 
suspects this pattern is consistent with the collinearity issue related to TREND. The INT 
variable covers the period from October 2003 through December 2004, which is 
essentially five seasons, two of which are winter. In general, Robberies tend to occur 
more often in winter months8, so the correlation between INT and ALL ROB includes 
one additional season’s worth of Robberies. As the intervention variables are lagged, the 
temporal effect of the extra winter season is diminished, and with it, the statistically 
significant positive relationship observed in the relationship between All ROB and INT. 
Due to the likely spurious relationship with the INT variable, ALL ROB is excluded from 
further analysis. 
Another correlation of note involving ALL ROB was a weak negative correlation 
with MISDARR. Such a relationship could conceivably validate a “broken windows” 
approach to police activity. If Robbery offenders are also engaged in lesser misdemeanor 
crimes, then policing focus on misdemeanor offenses (causing an increase of 
misdemeanor arrests) could yield Robbery offenders, and thereby reduce the number of 
Robberies. This is an unexpected and ancillary finding to the focus of this study; 
                                                 
8 While no statistically significant relationship exists between ALL ROB and MEANTEMP in this data, the 
direction of the relationship is negative. 
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however, it is of interest due to the potentially intervening effects of the IMPACT 
focused patrols performed jointly by State Police, Monroe County Sheriffs and the 
Rochester Police Department during the summer of 2004. This patrol could have 
produced the type of focus on lesser offenses necessary to increase misdemeanor arrests. 
Alternatively, ALL ROB and MISDARR are both correlated to TREND, again 
illustrating the likely spurious relationship between ALL ROB and MISDARR. 
Whereas the ALL ROB variable had a statistically significant relationship with 
the original intervention variable, the MB ROB variable was observed to have a weak, 
negative relationship (r=-.269) with LAGS (INT_4) of statistical significance. Unlike the 
ALL ROB variable, MB ROB did not have a relationship with TREND of statistical 
significance, making collinearity due to temporal factors not an issue9. In addition to the 
statistically significant relationship with LAGS (INT_4), the author observed a weak, 
negative relationship (r=.-245) between MB ROB and LAGS (INT_3) that approaches 
statistical significance (p= .066). No other relationships of significance were observed 
between MB ROB and the other independent variables. 
The only other dependent variable to have a significant relationship with one of 
the intervention variables was MB HOM, with a weak, negative relationship (r=-.271) 
with LAGS (INT_3). A significant relationship was also observed between MB HOM 
and MEANTEMP (r=.318). These relationships suggest a significant decrease in M/B/15-
30 homicides occurred during the intervention period, (lagged three months), and that 
homicides in the demographic increased as temperature increased. 
                                                 
9 Other independent variables of a temporal context were also examined. MEANTEMP does not have a 
statistically significant relationships with any of the intervention variables nor MB ROB, although MB 
ROB has a weak, negative relationship with MEANTEMP that approaches significance (p=.065). 
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Multiple Regression 
 As a result of the correlation matrix, several relationships worth examining 
through regression analysis were identified. The dependent variables MB HOM and MB 
ROB have significant (or near-significant) relationships with the intervention variables 
LAGS (INT_3) and LAGS (INT_4), as well as the proxy independent variable for 
seasonality, MEANTEMP. Therefore, the following models were evaluated: 
Model 1- MB HOM = constant + LAGS (INT_3) +MEANTEMP 
Model 2- MB HOM = constant + LAGS (INT_4) +MEANTEMP 
Model 3- MB ROB = constant + LAGS (INT_3) +MEANTEMP 
Model 4- MB ROB = constant + LAGS (INT_4) +MEANTEMP 
 All four models had fairly weak explanatory power, with no R-square value 
higher than R²=.153. These low values indicate a substantial amount of variance within 
both MB HOM and MB ROB that regression analysis failed to account for, either due to 
limitations of OLS in the context of time-series data10, or the influence of unaccounted 
for predictor variables. The author attempted to examine the data using ARIMA 
modeling, but was unable to identify representative error structures consistent with the 
three sources of noise that ARIMA corrects for: auto-regression, integration, and moving 
averages. 
 The primary goal of this study, however, was not to create a predictive model, but 
to evaluate the extent to which the Ceasefire intervention is responsible for changes in 
                                                 
10 OLS modeling may produce incorrect results when dealing with time-series data, as autocorrelation in 
the time-series violates the assumption of independence in the error term of the regression model (“Chapter 
9”, 2003). 
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homicide, gun assault 1st, and gun robbery 1st, particularly in the “high-risk” M/B/15-30 
demographic. For this purpose, the Beta statistic is of greatest interest, as it provides an 
assessment of the variance in the dependent variable explained solely by the predictor 
variable of interest, specifically, the intervention variable. In Model 1, the Beta for LAGS 
(INT_3) is β =-.250, and is, for practical purposes, statistically significant at p=.052. For 
Model 2, the Beta value of LAGS (INT_4) at β=-.231, is comparable to Model 1 but not 
statistically significant (p=.074). Model 3 has a Beta of β=-.269, similar to the Beta of 
Model 4 (β=-.268), both of which are statistically significant. Probability plots of 
residuals for the four models suggest that the models are a reasonably good fit for the 
data (See Appendix E). There does appear to be some slight oscillation, however, 
possibly due to seasonal fluctuations. While these models have included temperature as a 
proxy variable for seasonality, advanced time-series models control for these factors 
more effectively than OLS for the purposes of predictive modeling, but are out of the 
scope of analytical methods for this study. 
 As both Model 1 and Model 3 (the models using LAGS (INT_3) produced 
statistically significant Beta values, it seems likely that as of January 2004, the Ceasefire 
intervention was having measurable effect upon both the MB HOM and MB ROB 
variables. The Betas indicate that from January 2004 (three months after the intervention 
was implemented) to December 2004, homicides and gun-involved Robbery 1st incidents 
involving Black Males, ages 15-30 declined by an average of 25% and 26.9% per month, 
respectively. 
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If the intervention was having effect on the dependent variables by January 2003, 
one would expect to observe statistically significant Beta values for LAGS (INT_4) as 
well. While this was true for regression model 4 (involving MB ROB and LAGS 
(INT_4)), regression model 2 produced a Beta for LAGS (INT_4) that was not 
statistically significant. One possible reason for this phenomenon is a convergence of 
infrequent events and small sample size. The sample size for both Models 2 and 4 was 56 
cases, only barely the accepted minimum needed to perform regression analysis. 
However, while the average monthly number of events during the four month lagged 
intervention period was 6.27 for MB ROB, the average for MB HOM was only .82 per 
month. The total number of events during the four month lagged intervention period for 
MB ROB was 69, but only 9 for MB HOM. Low sample size does not seem to have been 
a problem in Model 4, where events were much more frequent, but the infrequency of 
events may have posed too much of a problem for the regression model to handle in the 
case of Model 2. Indeed, the results of Model 2 may be substantively significant, but OLS 
regression models seem to be an insufficient tool to ascertain the model’s statistical 
significance given the limitations of the data. 
To validate the variable selection method used for the regression models (i.e. t-
tests and correlations informing choice of variables to use), the author conducted five 
regressions on all six dependent variables- one for each intervention variable- including 
all independent variables in the model using the ENTER method. The results of the 30 
regressions mirror the results observed using the approach to variable selection employed 
by the author. For the dependent variables MB ASS and ALL ASS, no significant 
relationship with an intervention variable was observed in any model. This finding is in 
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keeping with the decision to exclude these variables from regression analysis as a result 
of their lack of correlation with any of the intervention variables.  ALL ROB exhibited 
statistically significant beta values with the three and four month-lagged intervention 
variables, but in both regression models also showed a statistically significant 
relationship with the TREND variable. Given the previously discussed collinearity 
problems between ALLROB, TREND and the intervention variables, the author believes 
this finding can be reasonably discounted. The “lumped” regression models showed one 
other result that was not produced by the author’s model selection method. The 
ALLHOM regression model where the three month-lagged intervention variable was 
used showed a statistically significant relationship between the two variables (β =-.429, 
p=.052). The only other independent variable in this model with a relationship of 
statistical significance with ALLHOM was MEANTEMP, which was expected given the 
widely known correlation between temperature and violence. Nevertheless, a statistically 
significant correlation between ALLHOM and LAGS (INT_3) did not exist in the 
correlation matrix, yet in the regression model this relationship exists. The author 
suspects this change is once again due to the involvement of the TREND variable. In the 
correlation matrix, LAGS (INT_3) exhibited a strong correlation with TREND and 
TREND exhibited a moderate correlation with ALLHOM. Therefore, the finding of a 
statistically significant relationship between ALLHOM and LAGS (INT_3) in the 
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Implications of Findings 
 
 
Program Goals and Evaluation Objectives 
 
 
 In the fall of 2003, the Rochester criminal justice community implemented 
Ceasefire for the purpose of responding to increases in gang-involved violent crime. 
Ceasefire had clearly definable goals: to reduce homicide among Black Males ages 15-
30, and by extension, reduce gun violence in the demographic. As homicide and gun 
violence victimization and offending disproportionately involves Black Males ages 15-30 
(and much of the violence in this demographic involved group dynamics), it was believed 
programmatic focus on this problem would yield reductions that would have an effect on 
total homicides and gun violence. 
This study sought to evaluate Rochester’s success or failure in achieving the goals 
of the Ceasefire program. In keeping with the program goals, this study assessed the 
impacts of the Ceasefire program on homicide and gun violence in the M/B/15-30 
demographic as well as overall homicide and gun violence. 
Were Ceasefire to achieve an optimal expected level of success in Rochester, an 
evaluation would have observed a “tipping point” effect in crime rates, where groups 
would be deterred from not simply from committing homicides but from engagement in 
homicide-producing behavior (i.e.-gun violence). This reduction in violent behavior 
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would obviously reduce levels of offending and victimization in the M/B/15-30 
demographic, but because that demographic comprises such a large portion of all 
homicide and gun violence, reductions in total levels of homicide and gun violence would 
also be observed. The homicide-gun violence link is implied in the deterrence message; 
One deters behavior not events, so in order to avoid an enforcement action, a group must 
refrain not just from committing homicides but from gun violence in general (as any 
shooting can easily become a homicide). This “tipping point” effect would have been the 
expected result of successful Ceasefire program, however, this research does not confirm 
the occurrence of this effect. Instead, the evaluation has found desirable but modest 
results of limited scope.  
 
Evidence for Satisfaction of Program Goals 
 
 A variety of measures indicate that the Ceasefire program has had meaningful 
effect in reducing homicide in the M/B/15-30 demographic. Simple measures show 
reductions of 41% in M/B/15-30 homicides, 8% in M/B/15-30 gun assaults, and 14% in 
M/B/15-30 gun robberies during the period Ceasefire was active (10/03-12/04) compared 
to the pre-test period (1/00-9/03). Statistically significant differences from pre-test to 
post-test means among M/B/15-30 homicides at one, three, and four-month intervention 
lags were observed using t-tests. Regression modeling indicated significant average 





Evidence against Satisfaction of Program Goals 
 
 The evaluation did not find much evidence to validate the “tipping point” 
hypothesis that reductions in M/B/15-30 homicides would produce reductions in M/B/15-
30 gun violence, and overall homicide and gun violence victimization. The simple pre-
test post-test measures indicated a decrease of 6.7% in the post-test period, but increases 
of 1.38 and 23.82 in total gun assault and gun robbery, respectably. The T-tests 
conducted also did little to validate the “tipping point” hypothesis. The only crime 
variable to show statistically significant decreases was the M/B/15-30 homicide variable, 
and, in contrast to the hypothesis, a statistically significant increase of total gun robberies 
was observed (9.8%) during the post-test period using a one month lag. Regression 
modeling showed only decreases in M/B/15-30 homicide and gun robbery, indicating no 
meaningful effects on total homicide and gun violence levels. 
 The findings suggest Ceasefire had effect in the area which it was primarily 
intended for (M/B/15-30 homicide victimization), however, there is limited support to 
suggest that the program was able to effect broader gun violence, showing a reduction 
only in gun robbery victimization in the M/B/15-30 demographic. The lack of a broad, 
“tipping-point” effect raises questions about the findings of this study. Deterrence occurs 
in a behavioral context; it is impossible to deter events, but it is possible to deter the 
behavior that produces the event. In this case, the behavior that produces a homicide is 
essentially the same as the behaviors that produce gun robberies or gun assaults, so 
efforts to deter homicides should also deter these similar behaviors.  The products of that 
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deterrence should be decreased homicide and gun violence, yet while homicides (in the 
M/B/15-30 demographic) decreased, gun violence in the demographic has not. This 
divergence is of concern, and will be examined more thoroughly in Chapter VI. 
 
 
Limitations of Study 
 
 
 The implications of the findings of this study have meaning not simply for 
Rochester crime policy, but perhaps for “focused deterrence” as a theoretical concept. 
The limitations and weaknesses of this study are therefore of particular interest when 
considering its’ implications. These limitations can be categorized, as they relate to either 
issues of research design or limitations of statistical tools and data. 
 
Limitations of Research Design 
 
 The fundamental challenge of examining the existence of deterrence is the one 
noted by Gibbs (1975), that deterrence, as phenomena, requires a context in which to be 
studied. The interrupted time-series research design employed by this study implies that 
decreases in levels of crime must be attributed to the deterrent effect that Ceasefire is 
intended to produce (when all recognizable factors are accounted for). The study does not 
measure the extent of deterrence produced, or if any deterrence was produced in the first 
place, it simply assumes that the Ceasefire program should, when implemented, cause 
reductions in specific crimes, and those reductions should be attributable to the intended 
deterrent characteristics of the program. 
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 On a more practical level, the interrupted time-series research design was not the 
optimal design for this study. Given the political and time constraints, this research 
design was the only option available, but a randomized control group study would have 
been a superior approach to this evaluation. This issue was previously discussed in 
Chapter III, but the primary advantage to control groups is the enhanced ability to control 
for unanticipated factors that might influence the program’s effect on the test population. 
A control group design would not have solved the problem of measuring actual 
deterrence but it would have improved the confidence in the validity of the research 
findings. 
 
Limitations of Statistical Tools & Data 
 
 The statistical toolset typically employed for time-series analysis does not, 
generally, respond well to limited datasets. This dataset of monthly crime counts 
consisted of 60 observations, 15 being in the post-test period, and only 12 in the three-
month lagged intervention variable that showed a statistically significant relationship 
with M/B/15-30 homicide. These numbers approach the bare minimum counts necessary 
to conduct statistical analysis, however is of even more concern given the numerical size 
of each observation. Gun assault, gun robbery, and homicide, especially, are fairly rare 
events. Any random fluctuation in such a limited dataset of rare events could produce a 
misleading effect when applying statistical methods. 
 The problem of limited data raises questions about the appropriate tools to apply 
to this dataset. The author attempted to conduct ARIMA analysis of the data set, but was 
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unable to decipher the noise structure of the crime data when examining ACF and PACF 
plots. The existence of correlations between several of the crime variables and the mean 
monthly temperature independent variable undermines the ACF and PACF plots, as 
seasonal correlation was clearly observed. The ACF and PACF plots may have failed as a 
diagnostic tool because of the limited size of the dataset. The ACF and PACF plots 
attempt to find noise patterns by lagging residuals, an approach made difficult by only 60 
observations. 
 The limited observations and rarity of events raise an inevitable question about 
the appropriateness of t-tests and beta values. This study assumes a normal distribution, 
in large part because the data used are parameter values- the study is only interested in 
examining what happened from 2000-2004. However, given the peculiar characteristics 
of this data, perhaps for statistical analysis purposes, tools using Poisson distributions 
would have been more appropriate. In his reviews of Boston Ceasefire data, Braga 
employed log-linear models (2001), and the Bai-Perron method of using Wald tests 
(2003) to identify structural breaks in time-series data, a method that is robust when 
dealing with potentially non-normally distributed data.  
 Besides data length issues, the other primary limitation of this study, in terms of 
statistical tools and data, is one of independent variable selection. The regression models 
used in this analysis considered a limited amount of alternative causal variables, and 
given the complexity of forces that impact violent crime rates, other unidentified factors 
that are potentially meaningful might exist. Medical care, for example, could greatly 
impact homicide counts from one year to the next if critically injured gunshot victims are 
operated upon. Another potential factor is police activity. In the summer of 2004, the 
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Rochester Police Department teamed with the Monroe County Sheriff’s Department and 
the New York State Police to conduct periodic focused patrol details in the most violent 
neighborhoods in the city, neighborhoods where gangs are disproportionately 
concentrated. This detail was not added into the evaluation primarily due to timing 
problems (the details ran periodically and could not match up to the unit of observation 
used in the study), as well as initial reviews of pre and post test data indicated limited or 
no impact on the crimes examined in this study. This detail and other police of varying 
scope have the potential to greatly impact infrequent events such as gun violence. 
 
Recommendations for Further Research 
 For the first year of Ceasefire in Rochester, this study’s findings are encouraging 
early indicators of a successful program; statistically significant monthly reductions of 
the target crime attributable to the Ceasefire program. While the study does not presume 
to be the conclusive evaluation of the Ceasefire program in Rochester, its findings 
validate (all other things being equal) the continuation of the program. However, there 
remains much to investigate, and the issues, questions, and findings of this research 
provide a useful stepping-stone for future evaluation research of Rochester’s Ceasefire 





Apply Different Statistical Tools to Dataset 
The positive finding of this study (statistically significant reductions in M/B/15-
30 homicide in the post-test period), is tempered by a variety of shortcomings, namely a 
short dataset of rare events and limits on research design and statistical analysis tools. 
The evaluations conducted on the Boston Ceasefire program utilized a 96 observation 
dataset (with a 24 observation post-test period) as well as statistical tools (log-linear 
regression informed by ARIMA modeling, and Bai-Perron structural breaks methods) 
beyond the purview of this study. For data as observed in Boston and Rochester, Braga’s 
methods are optimal. The log-linear models compensate for two primary weaknesses of 
this study, limited size of dataset and rarity of events (through a Poisson distribution and 
log-odds ratios) and the potential interference of time-series-related noise (through 
ARIMA modeling). The Bai-Perron method removes the weaknesses associated with 
dummy variables in this situation by testing for Wald statistics of significance across all 
possible break points of a series to test for breaks in the structure of the time-series as 
opposed to a change in parameters at the time of introduction of the dummy variable to 
the time-series. More conclusive findings involving the Ceasefire data will require 
approaches such as these over a longer period of study. 
 
Qualitative Examination of Focused Deterrent Effects 
Perhaps the area in most need of further research is the existence and extent of 
Ceasefire’s deterrent effect. No research has been done to examine what, if any message 
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is communicated from the call-in attendees to their fellow crew members, likewise, it is 
unclear whether the enforcement actions add meaningful credibility to the message and 
whether the enforcement actions are known to crew members that do not attend the call-
ins. If crews are aware that other crews are being taken off of the streets, do the crews 
associate this police activity with Ceasefire? Questions of this nature require a qualitative 
approach to examining the perceptions of crew members. Issues of punishment risk, 
intra-crew communication, peer pressure to offend, cohesiveness of the group unit, and 
the function of the “messenger” as a communication mechanism are among the critical 
questions to understanding how the assumed deterrence effects of Ceasefire actually 
work in practice. Qualitative efforts such as focus groups, surveys, or ethnographic 
observation of crew members could contribute greatly to the understanding of the 
individual and group behaviors that Ceasefire is intended to deter.  
 
Re-Assessment of Characteristics of Violent Crime 
 As a program, Ceasefire is an attempt to solve the problem of violence by 
addressing one of its’ primary characteristics, gang involvement. This characteristic 
matters because it is a substantial and definable pattern among a disparate set of 
characteristics that comprise the entirety of a communities’ violence problem. One can 
never hope to programmatically address all facets of violence in a community, much less, 
effectively, but patterns such as gang involvement provide law enforcement with an 
targeting opportunity, a means to concentrate resources for improved effectiveness and 
efficiency.  
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 It is, of course, possible that the major characteristics of violence in a community 
will change over time. Programs that target gang violence no longer remain relevant 
when the gang component of violence subsides. If violence dynamics change and no one 
is paying attention, police anti-violence strategies designed around a previous set of 
violence characteristics are left wasting precious resources and making no impact on the 
problem. For this reason, continuous review of the nature and characteristics of crime 
problems are essential to the prevention of the problem.  
In Rochester, strong partnerships exist between researchers and the Criminal 
Justice community. Through the process of implementing Ceasefire, practitioners have 
depended upon research to inform problem identification, implementation and evaluation. 
After just over a year of operation, the Ceasefire program was due for assessment of its 
success or failure in addressing the problem of gang homicide. Initial results indicate 
modest success in addressing the defined problem. The next step is to re-visit the initial 
problem identification stages of the effort to examine whether or not the problem of gang 
homicide still exists as a primary characteristic of local violence. Through continuous 
data-driven examination of Rochester’s violence characteristics, the local criminal justice 
system will have the knowledge necessary to adjust their strategies and efforts to achieve 












 The data reviewed for this study cover a time period from January 2000-
December 2004, with the Ceasefire program active from September 2003 through 
December 2004. Within the intervention period, the study observed a statistically 
significant average monthly reduction in M/B/15-30 homicides. As of July 2005, the 
Rochester Ceasefire program remains in place, yet homicide statistics have changed 
dramatically. Through the end of July 2005, 28 homicides have occurred in Rochester, 14 
of which were victims in the M/B/15-30 demographic. By contrast, 22 homicides 
occurred through the end of July 2004, with only 5 in the demographic. From 2000-2004, 
Rochester averaged 25 total homicides and 11 M/B/15-30 homicides through the end of 
July. Rochester homicide is at its second-highest level since 2000, exceeded only by the 
anomalous year of 2003.  
The 2005 data look nothing like the remarkable reductions of 2004, despite the 
ongoing efforts of the Rochester Ceasefire program. When these most recent seven 
months of homicide data are taken into consideration, the findings of this study inevitably 
come into question, and by extension, the effectiveness of the Rochester Ceasefire 
program. This chapter is intended to consider some of the possible explanations why 
Ceasefire has failed to produce in 2005, and what fixes may need to occur to get back on 




Regression to the Mean 
 The simplest explanation for the 2005 increase in homicide is that Ceasefire had 
no actual effect in 2004, and that both the 2004 decreases and the 2005 increases so far 
are variance around the mean level of homicide in Rochester. This explanation is a real 
possibility; the statistically significant findings of this study were observed when using a 
lagged intervention variable that essentially used the twelve months of 2004 as the 
intervention period.  
In terms of yearly counts, the 2004 M/B/15-30 homicide total (nine) is much 
lower than the totals in any of the previous four years examined in the study (2000-2003). 
This seemingly meaningful drop, however, may be a function of the length of the data set 
rather than trend. For example, in January 2005, 3 of 6 homicides were in the M/B/15-30 
category. While three additional homicides may not seem to make a difference, 
homicides are rare statistical events, and even that small of a number could produce 
findings that are not statistically significant. Likewise, statistical significance says 
nothing about substantive significance, and since we possess no direct evidence of 
deterrence of M/B/15-30 homicides, it is entirely possible that the statistical significance 
observed is simply a coincidental byproduct of random variation that happens to align 
with an intervention that has a short evaluation timeframe. Further, 2004 is well within 
two standard deviations of the four-year yearly average of M/B/15-30 homicide, 
suggesting that 2004 may have been only a statistical fluctuation. 
A possible explanation for why the 2004 fluctuation occurred is related to 
Ceasefire, but not necessarily the product of the Ceasefire program. The decline may be 
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related to a well-known sociological phenomenon- the “Hawthorne effect11”. the idea 
behind the Hawthorne effect is that research subjects under observation change their 
behavior. Applied to Ceasefire, it is conceivable that research attention to the issue of 
gang homicide altered policing behavior, which in turn, altered offending behavior. So it 
may not have been the actual Ceasefire program that caused the reductions, but simply 
the focus on gang violence and the resulting changes of police behavior that caused the 
anomalous 2004 declines to occur. 
If indeed the dramatic reductions of 2004 were simply anomalous, then, 
distressingly, the implication is no changes in crime rate occurred. A finding of this 
nature would shed doubt upon Ceasefire as a mechanism to deliver focused deterrence, 
and/or upon focused deterrence as a viable context of deterrence theory.  
 
Systems/Implementation Explanations for the Increase 
 The most obvious and perhaps the most convincing explanation for the 2005 
failures of Ceasefire is an institutional inability to implement the program as designed. 
There is evidence to suggest that the Rochester program has not followed through 
operationally, and Kennedy attributes the eventual failure of Boston’s Ceasefire to a 
breakdown in the operational process (2002). If a breakdown in the process occurred, it 
might have occurred in one (or more) of three main components of the overall Ceasefire 
process: inter-agency communication, conducting enforcement actions, or 
communicating the deterrence message to crews. 
 
                                                 
11 The term “Hawthorne effect” refers to a series of industrial management studies performed by 
Roethlisberger & Dickson from 1927-1932 (1939).  These studies observed that regardless of physical and 
environmental to the workplace, worker productivity improved under observation. 
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Inter-agency Communication 
 In Ceasefire, the term “pulling levers” describes the concept of concentrating 
diverse criminal justice resources on a specific target. This idea is the cornerstone of 
Ceasefire, so the ability to collectively concentrate resources is a critical task that partner 
agencies must quickly learn. The tasks that each agency must individually perform are 
not new- the District Attorney’s office understands how not to offer a plea bargain, 
Probation and Parole understand how to tighten their supervision conditions, etc. It is the 
strategic leverage of those resources in a coordinated fashion that is the difficult part. 
Coordinating the resources requires a great deal of inter-agency communication.  
Some communication issues are general and simple (what means of 
communication should be used? How frequently do we need to communicate?) but most 
are fairly complex and challenging. Through 2005, two inter-agency communication 
issues have proved problematic for Rochester, the criteria for commencing enforcement 
actions, and the target identification and enforcement action oversight process. 
 
Inter-Agency Communication:  
Defining Criteria for Commencing Enforcement Actions 
 
In Rochester, there appears to be a lack of clarity between agencies about the 
criteria that determines if a group should be the subject of an enforcement action. In 
theory, enforcement actions are precipitated by a “gang homicide”, unfortunately, 
confusion exists over how to define a “gang homicide”.  This communication breakdown 
is significant because it may mean groups who deserve to be enforcement action targets 
are not receiving attention because of the confusion. If groups who deserve to be targeted 
are not targeted, law enforcement is not following through on the punishment threat 
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delivered in the deterrence message. If the punishment message is not credible, other 
gangs will not be deterred from committing homicides and Ceasefire will have failed. 
The issue of criteria in Rochester Ceasefire is related to a national debate 
regarding the classification of “gang crime”. (Maxson & Klein, 1990) The issue of what 
constitutes a “gang crime” is relevant to Rochester Ceasefire, because the uncertainty 
over how to define a “gang homicide” is the crux of this particular inter-agency 
communication problem. Out of both the national and local debate, two definitions for 
“gang crime” emerge. One definition suggests that any crime where a victim or a suspect 
is a gang member should count as a “gang crime”. The other definition relies upon the 
context of the incident (i.e. were the instigating factors a product of gang activity) to 
determine if a crime is a “gang crime”. For the issue of “gang homicide” Rochester 
initially adopted the first definition, but over time, moved toward the second definition. 
As of July 2005, the Ceasefire administrative group had not come to a consensus on 
which definition would guide Ceasefire for the future. 
The lack of definitional clarity in Rochester has the capacity to limit program 
effectiveness, but the choice of which definition to use also has some significant 
implications for the program: 
1. Resource and expenditure issues: The first definition is broader than the second, 
meaning agencies will need to do more enforcement actions under the first 
definition than they would under second. More enforcement actions means 
agencies that are responsible for much of the enforcement action work (the police) 
will have to commit more resources to Ceasefire under the first definition than 
under the second definition. These agencies may not have (or may be unwilling to 
commit) additional resources, forcing the existing resources to do more that may 
reduce their effectiveness. 
 
2. Message continuity issues: The difference in definition is important because it is 
directly related to the Ceasefire deterrence message. At the call-in, the message 
delivered to gang members is “if one of your gang members commits a homicide, 
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the entire gang gets special attention from law enforcement”. The first definition 
of what provokes an enforcement action is perfectly symmetrical with the 
deterrence message, the second definition, however, is not. The second definition 
indicates the event must be gang precipitated, meaning a gang member, on his 
own, could commit a homicide and that homicide would not count as a “gang 
homicide”. The deterrence message makes no such distinction. It is possible that 
use of the second definition could hurt the credibility of the deterrence message 
by not going after all homicides in which a gang member is involved. 
 
 
 Clearly, a common definition is essential for Ceasefire. The lack of a clear 
definition produces confusion, and as a result of that confusion, the administrative group 
may not be targeting gangs that deserve to be targeted. When other gangs see that gangs 
involved in homicides have not been targeted, the punishment threat will lose credibility, 
and in turn, the effectiveness of Ceasefire will be compromised. To fix the problem, 
Rochester ought to adopt the first definition. While the first definition is more resource 
intensive than the second definition, it is a much better fit to the deterrence message. The 
second definition is contrary to the deterrence message, and also risks damaging the 
credibility of the program. In a sense, adopting the second definition would almost be as 
bad as having no definition at all.  
 
Inter-Agency Communication:  
Identifying Target Crews and Overseeing Enforcement Actions 
 
The second inter-agency communication problem in Rochester Ceasefire is the 
identification of target crews and coordinating of enforcement actions against them. To 
target a crew, Ceasefire’s administrative group reviews homicides and receives 
intelligence about the presence of crew involvement in the homicide. If crew involvement 
exists, and the homicide fits the appropriate criteria (as previously discussed), the crew 
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involved is targeted for an enforcement action, and a working group is established to 
implement the enforcement action. 
While this process sounds simple and fluid, inter-agency communication 
breakdowns have caused this process to come to a near standstill. To make the process 
work, the administrative group must: pay continual attention to potential target cases, 
have continual engagement and participation by members of the administrative group, 
and have agency representatives at the working group table who have the authority to 
implement the enforcement action. Each of the three components of the targeting and 
operations process is problematic in Rochester: 
 
1. Continual attention to potential target cases- The administrative group 
reviews case information on new homicides that occur during the two weeks 
prior to the meeting. In such a short time span, many cases have not yet been 
fully investigated, so gang connections remain unclear. As new information 
on unclear cases has emerged over time, the administrative group has not 
returned to those cases to make a decision regarding an enforcement action. In 
fact, because gang involvement has not been readily apparent in many cases, 
the eventual decision to target a crew is made informally by those 
coordinating enforcement actions at RPD after consulting with homicide 
investigators. The results of those decisions are sometimes shared with the 
administrative group and sometimes not shared. The de-formalization of the 
decision-making process is a result of lack of long-term attention by the 
administrative group to homicide cases where additional information is 
needed to make a decision. Because this devolution of power has occurred, the 
administrative group essentially has no meaningful decision-making power in 
the target selection process.   
 
2. Participation by administrative group members- The administrative 
meetings are for agency leaders and occur every two weeks. When an agency 
head is unable to attend, they send a representative. The representatives may 
not have a complete understanding of Ceasefire, may not fully understand the 
context and relevance of information discussed at the meeting, and have no 
authority to make decisions for the agency they represent. This lack of 
understanding is detrimental because important information discussed at a 
meeting may not get back to the agency head and agendas at the 
administrative meeting are slowed down each time an agency head is not 
present to participate in important decisions.  
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3. Power at the working group table- Early in the Ceasefire process, a formal 
working group meeting was commissioned to implement an enforcement 
action against a target group. Agency heads were asked to send 
representatives to the working group meetings who were able to deal with the 
day-to-day implementation of the enforcement actions. The representatives 
who would attend the early working group meetings possessed little 
knowledge about Ceasefire and had little authority to return to their agency 
and carry out the tasks asked of them by the working group. As a result of the 
group’s ineffectiveness, enforcement actions began to be coordinated out of 
RPD (as they bore the most burden for the enforcement action) with informal 
communication with other agencies, as needed. 
 
Collectively, the three major problems associated with the process of target 
selection and enforcement action oversight could have had a major adverse impact on the 
success of Ceasefire. Fixing these problems must be a priority in Rochester, and good 
solutions to the problems are, as of this writing, being implemented. Rochester is 
implementing an administrative meeting agenda with greater structure, to include a 
review of all open homicide cases at administrative meetings. In the future, the 
administrative group will classify homicide cases as “Ceasefire-eligible”, Not Ceasefire-
eligible”, and “Unknown”, and will review all information on enforcement actions 
underway for “Ceasefire-eligible” homicides. The administrative group will also be 
updated on the investigative progress of all “Unknown” cases, so that the group can 
collectively make a decision on an enforcement action as soon as sufficient information is 
available. Additionally, a formal working group model is to be re-formed with high-
ranking agency officials who have the knowledge and authority to carry out enforcement 
actions as intended. The working group will receive direction from and report directly to 
the administrative group. Given the existing problems associated with the target 
identification and enforcement action oversight process, Rochester’s solutions, if 
implemented, should resolve these problems effectively. 
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Inter-Agency Communication: Summary 
If  problems with inter-agency communication are a cause of Ceasefire’s 2005 
failure, the lack of clear criteria for commencing enforcement actions, and the 
degradation of the target identification and enforcement action oversight process are, in 
large part, responsible. The communication breakdowns in these critically important 
aspects of Ceasefire are fixable. By agreeing on a “gang homicide” definition, and 
following through on the oversight process reforms already implemented, Rochester 
should be able to correct weaknesses in this area and reclaim the successes of 2004.  
 
Conducting Enforcement Actions 
 Executing enforcement actions is another component of the Ceasefire process in 
which problems have occurred, problems that may be related to the failure of Ceasefire in 
2005.  While the problems related to administration and oversight of the enforcement 
actions are a concern, the actual execution of enforcement action operations are a 
separate issue with separate problems. The problems experienced by Rochester (as 
observed by the author) include:  limitations of investigational strategies, overburdened 
officers, and conflicting organizational goals. 
 
Conducting Enforcement Actions: Limitations of Investigational Strategies 
Disproportionately, the burden of carrying out an enforcement action is placed 
upon the police department with other agencies playing supporting roles. Probation and 
Parolees typically account for no more that 25% of the members of a group- a limited 
target for Probation and Parole resources. Prosecutorial partners can only work after 
 85
cases have been made against the crew members. The police have little option but to 
conduct the bulk of the case work associated with the enforcement action. Because they 
play a central role, police effort is a significant factor in the success or failure of an 
enforcement action.  
 Through July 2005, all enforcement actions conduced by the Rochester Police 
Department have almost exclusively involved narcotics investigations, with virtually no 
involvement by patrol resources. In these investigations, narcotics officers have used 
three levels of investigation. Of the six enforcement actions done by Rochester (through 
July 2005), each level has been used twice. 
• Simple Narcotics Investigation: This type of investigation involves 
purchasing illegal narcotics from crew members by a combination of 
confidential informants (C.I.s) and undercover officers. The goal of the 
investigation is to buy narcotics from as many crew members as possible, and 
eventually conduct a “sweep” where all of the investigation targets are picked 
up and charged with drug possession or sales. This investigation type has the 
initial dramatic benefit of the “sweep”, but the nature of the charges (non-
violent felony or misdemeanor offenses) is not substantially different from 
typical drug sentences an offender might experience. For a crew member who 
has already been through the criminal justice system as a result of his crew’s 
drug activity, the charges produced from this investigation type may not be a 
sufficiently severe punishment threat. 
 
• Wiretap Investigation: This level of investigation uses wiretaps and camera 
surveillance to complement the undercover narcotics investigations. Because 
of the additional information they provide, these tools can be useful to build 
more substantial narcotics cases against crew members. Wiretaps require 
constant observation, however, and take officers away from other methods of 
building narcotics cases. In practice, once a wiretap is commenced, existing 
cases against crew members are strengthened but few new cases are built. 
While the approach yields quality cases, it does not always target a large 
number of crew members. 
 
• Violent Crime Task Force Investigation: The most successful Rochester 
enforcement actions have used the investigative strategy of targeting crews 
with the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) 
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Act12. Rochester is able to use Federal laws through the Violent Crime Task 
Force (VCTF), which is comprised of RPD officers and Federal law 
enforcement agents. The investigations are long-term, utilizing undercover 
narcotics cases, electronic surveillance methods, and historical records to 
prove conspiracy to engage in racketeering activity. This strategy is distinctive 
because the investigative effort is thorough. The VCTF works only on these 
investigations, allowing for patience and creativity. The combination of 
patience and unique investigative resources result in investigations that 
produce serious cases13 against large quantities of gang members. 
 
 Clearly, the local/federal investigatory partnerships involving conspiracy cases 
are the most powerful tools currently available in the Rochester Ceasefire toolbox. That 
tool is, however, the most resource intensive and the slowest of the three major 
investigative strategies. Unfortunately, all three investigative strategies possess some sub-
optimal trait, whether it be weak cases, not enough cases, or too lengthy. Any of these 
three weaknesses are a problem. Over time, crew members may observe these negative 
traits and interpret them as evidence of lack of follow-through on the punishment threat.   
 
Conducting Enforcement Actions: Overburdened Officers 
The narcotics officers in a police department are a desirable yet scarce resource. 
They are highly skilled and have the capacity to conduct unique and useful investigations, 
but narcotics units are non-essential police functions and have low staffing levels 
(relative to primary police functions such as patrol or criminal investigations). As a 
result, they are overburdened with work responsibilities. In Rochester, the large 
workloads carried by narcotics officers have negatively impacted the effectiveness of 
Ceasefire enforcement actions. In addition to enforcement actions, investigative burdens 
                                                 
12 RICO, which is Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, allows federal law enforcement to 
impose sanctions for “any person employed or associated with any enterprise engaged in…a pattern of 
racketeering activity” (Title 18 U.S.C 1962). In United States v. Turkette (452 U.S. 576), the Supreme 
Court confirmed that the term “enterprise” covered illegitimate organizations such as gangs. 
13 Arguably the most serious charges of all investigative strategies, as all charges are Federal charges. 
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for narcotics officers include following up drug hotline complaints, support of major 
crimes investigations (undercover surveillance of suspects, narcotics investigations into 
conspirators in a murder case to create leverage), and other long-term investigations. As a 
result, narcotics officers are forced to juggle a multitude of investigative priorities 
without giving any investigation a thorough effort. 
The investigations necessary to make an enforcement action a success require 
great skill and creativity. The level of demand placed upon the officers forces them to 
maximize their efficiency by clearing their plates of responsibility for cases in the 
quickest way possible. The operational mindset to “just get it done” is a perfectly 
reasonable approach to an overwhelming workload, but lumping enforcement actions in 
with the regular workload shortchanges the extra effort and special nature of enforcement 
actions that differentiate them from typical police behavior. To truly validate the 
punishment threat of the Ceasefire deterrence message, enforcement actions require 
quality cases on most, if not all, members of a target crew. The current lack of singular 
focus upon enforcement action investigations in Rochester has, in many instances, 
resulted in sub-optimal enforcement actions.  
 
Conducting Enforcement Actions: Conflicting Organizational Goals 
Another problem associated with the execution of enforcement actions is the 
conflict of goals between Ceasefire and traditional narcotics investigations. Narcotics 
investigations place a premium on the identification and prosecution of high-value 
targets. In contrast, Ceasefire enforcement actions are meant to utilize narcotics 
enforcement as a mechanism for incapacitating violent gangs. This disparity in goals is 
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relevant because an enforcement action conducted under the goal structure of regular 
narcotics investigations will not yield the effect desired for the Ceasefire program. 
High-value targets (drug kingpins) tend to be well insulated from their illegal 
businesses. Catching high-value targets typically involves a technique known as 
“flipping” whereby cases are first developed against subordinates or associates of the 
high-value target. The subordinates are offered reduced sentences in exchange for their 
cooperation and participation in the case against the  high-value target. 
The tactic of “flipping” is a ubiquitous investigatory concept, but when paired 
with the typical narcotics mindset of going after high-value targets, cases against lesser 
targets are generally exchanged for information against the high-value target rather than 
being vigorously prosecuted. This poses a problem in Ceasefire enforcement actions 
where the goal is not to take down a single high-value target, but to take down an entire 
group. The enforcement action targets may not necessarily the typical targets of narcotics 
investigation. The members of a target crew will typically be low-level drug dealers, the 
type of individual that law enforcement might try to “flip” to gain information about a 
higher-value target. Despite the inclination to “flip” such crew members, such individuals 
must be vigorously prosecuted. The punishment threat of Ceasefire tells offenders the 
whole crew will be subject to enforcement (if the crew commits a homicide), and for that 
threat to be credible, the enforcement actions must re-enforce the threat. Unfortunately, 
this goal conflict has occurred in Rochester in several enforcement actions, with the 




Conducting Enforcement Actions: Fixing the Problems 
Because the problems associated with conducting enforcement actions are so 
similar, one common “fix” may effectively solve the three problems of investigatory 
limitations, overburdened officers, and conflicting organizational goals. To achieve an 
optimal level of effectiveness with enforcement actions, it may be necessary to assign a 
narcotics team (or teams) specifically and exclusively to Ceasefire. Enforcement actions 
(as evidence of the punishment threat) are most effective when they produce the results 
that only major investigations like RICO cases can achieve, but those cases require time 
and effort. The creativity and focus needed for such investigations are not possible when 
Ceasefire is lumped in with a plethora of other competing responsibilities. A specifically 
assigned “Ceasefire team” would also have the benefit of breaking out of the typical 
organizational mindsets of narcotics officers. The team could benefit from training about 
the Ceasefire program, and the operational mindset of the team could be better aligned 
with the goals of Ceasefire by removing the team from a typical narcotics caseload.  
Perhaps too, it has been a mistake to rely solely on the limited resources of 
narcotics officers to conduct enforcement actions. Patrol resources have not (as of yet) 
been efficiently coordinated into Ceasefire enforcement actions. Police frequently 
respond to calls for service, special details, or other independent proactive police work in 
gang territories, yet none of that policing behavior has been integrated into enforcement 
actions. In a coordinated fashion, patrol resources could be effectively directed into a 
targeted group’s territory. Those resources may contribute significant gun or drug arrests 
to the enforcement action, but may have a simpler use- moving the crew into houses 
where narcotics officers can generate and execute search warrants. 
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Conducting Enforcement Actions: Summary 
 Weaknesses in the execution of enforcement actions may be related to the failure 
of Rochester Ceasefire in 2005.  The problems of  investigational limitations, 
overburdened officers, and conflicting organizational goals are closely related to one 
another, and may have cumulatively damaged the effectiveness of the deterrence message 
by not sufficiently following through on the punishment threat. The specific assignment 
of a RPD narcotics team exclusively to enforcement action could fix the problems 
associated with the implementation of enforcement actions. A separate unit would free 
officers from the other investigatory burdens, enable the use of the optimal investigatory 
strategy, and align the unit goals with the goals of the Ceasefire program. 
 
Communicating Deterrence Message 
 The delivery of the deterrence message is of critical importance to the success of 
Ceasefire. While communication of the deterrence message is critical, it is also difficult, 
and Rochester has had problems effectively communicating the deterrence message to 
gangs. Communication problems have occurred with: the selection of call-in attendees, 
the content and number of call-in presenters, and in other efforts to communicate the 
deterrence message to gang members. 
 
Communicating Deterrence Message: The Selection of Call-in Attendees 
 The most obvious way in which call-in communication failures occur is by 
inviting inappropriate attendees to the call-in. Gang intelligence is critical to Ceasefire in 
several ways, but the choice of call-in attendees is perhaps the most important. When 
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non-members are invited, the idea of attendees as “messengers” falls apart, because the 
attendee is not a crew member. Because the message is not being delivered to the correct 
audience, no deterrence can be generated. Worse, the effort is less likely to be credible if 
the target population (gang members) becomes aware that law enforcement cannot 
differentiate gang members from non-gang members. Inevitably, intelligence will be 
incorrect at some point, and while it is impossible to know many intelligence failures it 
takes to damage the effectiveness of the message, continued failures over time may have 
serious negative consequences.  
To minimize intelligence failures, Rochester developed a robust system of 
intelligence gathering, cross-referencing report information with observations from street 
officers. Despite this system, the occurrence of incorrect call-in attendee choices could be 
a possibility, particularly early in the program when intelligence-gathering efforts were 
not yet fully implemented. Intelligence failures could still occur in Rochester because the 
intelligence gathering system is dependent upon human factors. The research analyst (a 
position occupied by this author) is solely responsible for the vetting of all intelligence, 
and specifically, for each call-in’s attendee list. The analyst’s intelligence and attendee 
selection protocols (or deviation from) play a central role, and breakdowns at this stage of 
the process could completely undermine the goals of Ceasefire if the wrong individuals 
are invited to the call-in.   
 If problems associated with the selection of call-in attendees are to blame for 
Ceasefire’s lack of 2005 success, the fixes to the problems are well within reach. Inviting 
the appropriate people to call-ins is a critically important part of Ceasefire, because 
communication of the deterrence message depends almost entirely upon the call-in 
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attendees. The current system in Rochester for vetting call-in candidates needs more 
checks and balances against intelligence mistakes than it currently has. To resolve this 
problem, a three-person committee should be all be reviewing the same intelligence and 
collectively making decisions about an individual’s fitness to attend the call-in. 
Additional review of intelligence information by other people will minimize the mistakes 
that a singe individual might make in this critical position. 
 
Communicating Deterrence Message: Content and Number of Presenters 
 Successful communication of the deterrence message at the call-in requires two 
equal things- the correct attendees to receive the message and presenters who can 
articulate the deterrence message effectively. Since Ceasefire’s implementation, problems 
have occurred with both the content of call-in presenters’ messages and with the number 
of presenters at the call-in. At the call-ins to date, as many as 20 different presenters have 
spoken and the number of presenters per call-in has varied from three to eight. The 
speakers all have the same basic task of delivering the deterrence message, but with so 
many different presenters, at least one presenter is bound to get it wrong. 
 Rochester presenters have been “off-message” on a variety of instances, owing 
either to a lack of preparation, alternate agenda (notably promoting the saving power of 
Jesus Christ), or inability to grasp the correct message. Indeed, presenter communication 
of the message has been a frequent problem in Rochester. Typical mistakes include 
substituting all violence for homicide in the message (as the precipitating event for an 
enforcement action) or espousing a vague and general “we are watching you, and are 
coming after any illegal activity you are involved in” message. While the occasional 
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deviation from intended messages is to be expected, the continual barrage of disparate 
messages from speakers may produce serious cognitive dissonance for attendees. If the 
attendee does not understand the deterrence message, they will be unable to deliver the 
message to their fellow crew members. In recent call-ins, Rochester has attempted to 
correct this problem by allowing for only the same four speakers to present at call-ins: the 
police Lieutenant in charge of the homicide unit, the District Attorney, and two police 
Investigators. Since changing the presenter composition, the message delivered at the 
call-in (anecdotally) contains fewer mistakes than in previous call-ins. 
The problem of presenter communication errors may have contributed to 
Ceasefire’s lack of 2005 success, but as of this writing, Rochester appears to have 
remedied the problem by limiting the number of presenters and closely controlling their 
message at the call-in. Limiting the number of presenters reduces the potential for 
communication mistakes, and ensures that all speakers repeat the key deterrence message 
themes without deviation. In addition to these solutions, the Rochester administrative 
group should constructively review the performance of each presenter after the call-in. 
An evaluative process of the call-in deterrence message will ensure that the message 
remains clear over time. 
 
Communicating Deterrence Message: Other Communication Efforts 
In addition to the call-in, Rochester has attempted to communicate with gang 
members in several other ways. A weakness of the call-in as a communication 
mechanism is the reliance of indirect communication with the target population. The 
successful communication of the message depends upon the attendee acting as a 
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messenger to a broader audience, so the effects produced by Ceasefire are only as good as 
your messengers. On two occasions, Rochester has implemented special details intended 
to directly communicate the Ceasefire deterrence message to gang members. Like the 
call-in, these efforts to communicate the deterrence message have had problems. 
The first detail was conducted by the Tactical Unit of the Rochester Police 
Department in cooperation with New York State Parole and the Monroe County 
Probation Department in October 2003. Officers were instructed by supervisors about 
Ceasefire and the deterrence message, and given target areas to work in. The target areas 
were gang locations, and officers were provided with name and address information on 
selected members of that gang who were under supervision. The detail was intended to 
seek out gang members on the corners and deliver the deterrence message in addition to 
contacting the gang members under supervision. A very similar detail, underway in 
Rochester as of May 2005, conducted the same activities, but also focused on getting in 
between gangs that were actively engaged in disputes. 
 Unfortunately, the details had the same communication problems inherent as the 
call-in. The details ask police officers (who typically have no familiarity with the 
Ceasefire program) to deliver a deterrence message that they may not fully understand. 
Like the call-in presenters, the officers are bound to get the message wrong, and the 
collective effects of that miscommunication at best create no beneficial deterrence effect, 
and, at worst, undermine the message through misstatements and falsehoods (in the 
context of Ceasefire). 
In the scope of efforts to communicate the deterrence message, the Ceasefire 
details have had limited effect, but the problems associated with the details may have 
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contributed to Ceasefire’s lack of 2005 success. A few small measures are necessary to 
fix the problems related to communication of the deterrence message by the Ceasefire 
details. The special details are a good complement to the call-ins, but greater training is 
necessary to reduce communication errors. Rochester has provided laminated cards with 
the message to officers, and has specifically trained some officers working the details, but 
room for error still exists. Future details should clearly delineate which personnel will 
deliver the Ceasefire message. Only those personnel should be involved in message 
delivery, and those people should be specifically trained and provided with support 
materials (laminated cards). In addition, the details should be periodically reviewed 
(perhaps by members of the administrative group) to ensure message integrity. These 
efforts will help to control quality and content of the deterrence message, and thereby 
ensure the appropriate message is communicated to the intended audience. 
 
Communicating Deterrence Message: Summary 
The delivery of the deterrence message is essential to Ceasefire’s success. Since 
Ceasefire’s inception, Rochester has had problems effectively communicating the 
deterrence message to gangs, and those problems (associated with the selection of call-in 
attendees, the content and number of call-in presenters, and other efforts to communicate 
the deterrence message to gang members) may have played a role in the program’s 2005 
decline. To fix these problems, greater oversight is needed, controlling the specifics of 




Summary of Systems/Implementation Explanations for 2005 Homicide Increase 
 Implementing programs is an inexact science, and the problems Rochester has 
experienced with inter-agency communication, conducting enforcement actions, and 
communication of the Ceasefire message, are reasonable challenges to the optimal 
implementation of Ceasefire. If the 2004 reductions experienced in M/B/15-30 homicides 
were not the product of random variation, these problems may be likely explanations for 
why Ceasefire has failed to affect homicides in the M/B/15-30 demographic in 2005. 
Besides regression to the mean and systems and implementation problems, an 
explanation for the 2005 decline could be theoretical weakness in the concept of focused 
deterrence. 
 
Theoretical Explanation for the Increase 
The explanations offered in this chapter for Ceasefire’s 2005 failure have thus far 
dealt with potential problems in the operationalization and implementation of Ceasefire. 
The failure of Ceasefire, however, when taken together with the eventual failure of 
Boston, is cause for concern that the failures may not be due to problems with 
implementation, but weaknesses inherent to focused deterrence. Two hypothetical 
problems may exist in the theory: The assumption that punishment can be consistent and 
credible, and the unanticipated way in which group behavior expedites deterrence decay. 
 
Theoretical Explanation for the Increase: Credibility and Consistency Problems 
Focused deterrence requires a credible punishment threat, and a credible 
punishment threat depends upon the consistent application of punishment to targeted 
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groups. To be deterred, non-target groups must perceive that they will get the 
punishments they are threatened with if they commit a homicide, In order to maintain that 
perception, actual punishments must be certain, meaning that when a group commits a 
homicide, the group must always receive those punishments. Hypothetically, the delivery 
of consistent punishments is possible, but in practice, criminal justice systems may not 
possess the resources and the level of coordination necessary to produce consistent 
punishment. The system is designed to process individual cases based on their specific 
merits. To ensure justice, no one agency controls the entire process, and the agencies 
involved generally act independent of one another. In a sense, the criminal justice system 
ensures that punishments are not consistently applied, because no two cases are the same, 
and following that logic, no two cases should receive the exact same punishment. If the 
assumption that criminal justice systems can deliver consistent punishments is false, it 
would represent a major weakness in the theory of focused deterrence, as punishment 
consistency and credibility are necessary pre-conditions of generating deterrence.  
In contrast to the problems associated with systems/implementation, theoretical 
problems may be impossible to fix. Nevertheless, by understanding the problems, the 
application of focused deterrence (Ceasefire) may be able to be re-structured to account 
for theoretical weaknesses in a more effective way. If true punishment consistency cannot 
fully be obtained, credibility may still be able to be produced by creating the perception 
that punishments are generally consistent. In order to create the perception of punishment 
consistency, law enforcement must only threaten punishments that can actually be 
delivered. If law enforcement “writes checks they can’t cash”, or over-promises 
punishments, all credibility is lost.  
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 Re-orienting Ceasefire to account for punishment consistency problems is quite 
possible. The avenue to correct this problem is through the enforcement actions. Typical 
investigations-focused enforcement actions are always partially a roll of the dice: no 
reliable or predetermined outcomes exist. Because no consistent punishment can be 
assured, this type of enforcement action may not generate a credible punishment threat. 
In the typical enforcement actions, the potential exists for very severe punishments of a 
group, but that potential is not always realized. Creating the perception of punishment 
consistency may require efforts in addition to investigations. For the purposes of 
Ceasefire, consistency is easiest to produce when it is clearly demonstrable and can be 
communicated.  
For example, if a homicide occurred and police knew gang X was involved, a 
consistent response would include leaving a single patrol officer at the corner 24 hours a 
day to deter foot drug traffic from gang X’s territory. RPD could communicate with gang 
X, explaining that an officer will be stationed there to disrupt drug traffic at this location 
for a time period (six months) because of their involvement in the homicide. The message 
could also be communicated (as part of a punishment threat) to other groups, and the 
other groups could also visibly see the officer in gang X’s territory all the time. By 
having that consistency, RPD could start to generate credibility with their punishment 
threat, and assuming the threat was sufficiently severe, could start to deter behavior 
leading to homicide.  
Of course, an officer on a street corner is not a severe punishment to a group. The 
officer might deter some drug sales, but generally would not impose much punishment on 
the group’s members. So the officer on the corner would have to be combined with the 
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narcotics investigations and the no-plea bargain policy from the District Attorney’s office 
to create sufficient severity. But all of these punishments would need to be communicated 
to the target group while the enforcement action was ongoing, as well as all other groups 
in the city. While letting a group know that they are currently being investigated for 
narcotics may not prove to be fruitful, the communication works to prove the 
consistency, and therefore, credibility of the police.  
The police need not say they are conducting a narcotics operation against a group, 
but could communicate to all groups: “group X was involved in (insert the specific 
homicide) and now they are at the top of our priority list and will be for the next six 
months. Among other things we will be doing during that time, you will be able to see a 
police officer in front of where they hang out, and no members of that crew will receive 
plea bargains for offenses they commit. We may do investigations on the group during 
that time, and we will communicate those results to you. Any other gangs that commit a 
homicide will get the same treatment.” 
While this is just an example, it serves to demonstrate an important point- that a 
credible punishment threat can be created through a combination of separate punishments 
with different purposes. In this example, the officer on the corner illustrates the certainty 
and consistency of the punishment, while the no-plea bargains and periodic investigations 
of groups represent the severity of the punishment. The current investigative-driven 
approach to enforcement actions cannot possibly be visible or consistent enough to 
illustrate to potential offenders that the threat of punishment is certain. Only a group-
focused punishment threat that includes elements of consistency, certainty and severity 
will deter acts of group violence. 
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Theoretical Explanation for the Increase: Group Role in Deterrence Decay  
One of the aims of focused deterrence is to harness group peer pressure for the 
purpose of re-enforcing the deterrence message. Theoretically, the deterrence message is 
communicated among the group, and group members pressure other members not to 
offend for fear of punishment for the whole group. If this aspect of the theory is true, the 
inter-group communication process exerts powerful influence over members of the 
group. This communication process is not well understood, and while it is beneficial for 
the purposes of initially generating deterrence, it may also play a role in accelerating the 
decay of deterrence effects. 
In the initial phases of Ceasefire, focused deterrence should produce strong 
effects. Ceasefire represents a new operational approach to gang homicide, and the 
criminal justice system is reacting in an aggressive fashion. Gang members are faced with 
intense scrutiny of their gangs, unfamiliar punishment threats, and some evidence 
(through early enforcement actions) that law enforcement is for real. If focused 
deterrence works, the effects should be strongest at this point because gang members are 
uncertain about actual punishment risks and may take law enforcement claims of 
credibility at face value. Assuming the inter-group communication process works, these 
heightened punishment risks would be communicated back to the group, and group 
members would pressure other members to not commit homicide. 
Over time, however, gang members have the opportunity to re-assess punishment 
risks associated with Ceasefire. If the actual punishments delivered by law enforcement 
have been less than what was threatened, future punishment threats are not likely to be 
seen as credible. Likewise, if law enforcement has failed to follow through on punishing 
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gangs involved in homicide, the credibility of the punishment will decline. All offenders 
eventually re-assess punishment risk, and as a result, some offenders may no longer be 
deterred. This phenomenon is known as “deterrence decay”.  
Focused deterrence effects start to decay when gang members become aware that 
law enforcement punishment threats are not as certain or severe as advertised. Just as the 
inter-group communication process played a role in generating deterrence, it most likely 
influence deterrence decay. The process most likely influences deterrence decay by 
accelerating the rate of decay. Once information contrary to the deterrence message is 
introduced into a crew from a credible source (perhaps a cousin who is in another group 
that was involved in a homicide, but was not punished), the new information should 
circulate through the group quickly, and group members will convince other members 
that the punishment threat associated with Ceasefire is not credible. Further, it may be 
that “tipping points” exist in gang members willingness to perceive punishment threats as 
credible. After a certain point, the inter-group communication process may permanently 
discount the credibility of threats from law enforcement. In other words, once the gang 
decides the deterrence message is not credible, there may be no way to reverse that 
perception, and therefore, not ability to deter. 
It may not be possible to “fix” the problem of group behavior expediting 
deterrence decay. The inter-group communication process that, at first, generates 
deterrence, eventually works to undermine deterrence. This problem appears to simply be 
an unintended consequence of the long-term application of focused deterrence.  
If punishment threats cannot maintain long-term credibility (as discussed earlier), the 
group dynamic of focused deterrence will accelerate deterrence decay rendering 
 102
Ceasefire ineffective. This weakness of focused deterrence has a significant implication- 
perhaps Ceasefire (as an application of focused deterrence) only has a limited shelf life as 
a program. As a short-term remedy to a serious homicide problem, Ceasefire can be 
effective, but perhaps it is not an acceptable long-term strategy to reduce homicide. 
 All of this analysis is, of course, conducted from a perspective grounded in 
criminological theory. The suggestions offered in this chapter are consistent with an 
understanding of Deterrence theory. However, issues related to focused deterrence are 
also issues of group behavior and the modification of behavior. These issues are, at their 
core, fundamentally issues for the field of Psychology. Perhaps review of existing 
research on behavioral modification (for individuals and groups) could inform both 
problems observed in focused deterrence theory. A review of psychology literature may 
find, for example, that behavior is best reinforced intermittently rather than consistently, 
indicating the need for an entirely different “fix” for the problems of focused deterrence 
rather than the ones prescribed in this chapter. The lessons taken from other 
complimentary fields may provide solutions necessary to ensure the viability of focused 
deterrence theory.   
 
Theoretical Explanation for the Increase: Summary 
This chapter reviewed two potential flaws in focused deterrence: The possibly 
invalid assumption that punishment can be consistent and credible, and the way in which 
group behavior expedites deterrence decay. Unlike earlier problems discussed in this 
chapter, these theoretical problems have no clear fixes. The second problem (group 
dynamics accelerating deterrence decay) is dependent upon the first problem 
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(maintaining credible long-term punishment threats). The first problem can be addressed 
by improving offender’s perceptions of punishment consistency and credibility. By 
aligning punishment threats to actual punishments, and by adding punishments that 
demonstrate consistency, offender perceptions of punishment consistency may be able to 
be altered. If these improvements are made, the second problem may not be an issue. If 
not, the combinations of both the first and second problems may mean Ceasefire is at best 



































 The Ceasefire program was implemented in Rochester, NY as a response to the 
city’s high rates of homicide victimization. Research into Rochester’s homicide problem 
revealed very high concentrations in victimization and offending by Black Males ages 15 
to 30. In many cases involving Black Male (ages 15 to 30) homicide victims or suspects, 
evidence of gang affiliation existed. Ceasefire was implemented in the hope that its 
focused deterrence based approach to violence prevention could ameliorate Rochester’s 
problem of gang homicide.  
The goal of this study was to evaluate Rochester N.Y.’s focused-deterrence based 
program, Ceasefire. The dataset used in the study were monthly victimization counts of 
Homicide, Assault 1st, and Robbery 1st incidents from January 2000 to December 2004. 
The study examined overall monthly victimization counts and victimization counts of the 
M/B/15-30 demographic. Multiple regression analyses indicated statistically significant 
reductions in average monthly Homicide and Robbery victimizations of the M/B/15-30 
demographic during the intervention period (October 2003 to December 2004) when 
compared to a four-year pre-intervention period (January 2000 to September 2003).  
While these findings are indicative of success of the Ceasefire program in 
Rochester, the findings should be interpreted with caution. Method choices were 
appropriate for this study, but were constrained by limitations of the data in addition to 
the nature of the Rochester Ceasefire program. Over a longer period of observation, data 
used in this study might prove more amenable to alternate methods, and may or may not 
yield contrasting results to this study. 
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As an evaluation, this study offers little concrete evidence of the effectiveness of 
Rochester’s Ceasefire program. While the study does find evidence of success in the first 
15 months of the program (using less than optimal methods), Rochester’s 2005 homicide 
levels have risen, and victimization in the M/B/15-30 demographic has increased 
substantially. A variety of reasons exist to explain the homicide increase, but 
nevertheless, it has occurred, and casts doubt upon the effectiveness of Rochester’s 
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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  MB HOM ALL HOM MB ASS ALL ASS MB ROB ALL ROB 
Valid 60 60 60 60 60 60 N 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 1.53 3.58 1.92 3.23 8.72 43.58 
Median 1.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 8.00 40.00 
Mode 0 2 1 2 4 35 
Std. Deviation 1.535 2.036 1.211 2.273 4.665 14.109 
Skewness .925 .218 1.052 1.314 .666 .675 
Std. Error of Skewness .309 .309 .309 .309 .309 .309 
Kurtosis .331 -.873 .282 1.322 .633 -.186 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .608 .608 .608 .608 .608 .608 
Range 6 8 5 9 24 59 
Minimum 0 0 0 1 0 21 














































































































































































































Figure C: Independent Samples T-Tests (Grouping by Intervention Variables) 
 
Independent Samples T-Tests (INT) 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 




Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances 
assumed 2.065 .156 -1.574 58 .121 -.71 .452 -1.616 .193 
MB HOM 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.821 32.172 .078 -.71 .390 -1.506 .084 
Equal variances 
assumed .058 .810 -.400 58 .691 -.24 .611 -1.468 .979 
ALL HOM 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.377 21.933 .709 -.24 .648 -1.588 1.099 
Equal variances 
assumed .002 .963 -.428 58 .670 -.16 .364 -.884 .572 
MB ASS 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.431 24.330 .670 -.16 .361 -.900 .589 
Equal variances 
assumed .029 .865 .065 58 .948 .04 .683 -1.323 1.412 
ALL ASS 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .066 24.544 .948 .04 .675 -1.347 1.436 
Equal variances 
assumed .015 .904 -.877 58 .384 -1.22 1.394 -4.012 1.568 
MB ROB 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.909 25.609 .372 -1.22 1.345 -3.988 1.544 
Equal variances 
assumed 1.955 .167 2.424 58 .018 9.80 4.043 1.708 17.892 
ALL ROB 
Equal variances 
















Independent Samples Test (INT_1) 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 




Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances 
assumed 1.620 .208 -1.795 57 .078 -.83 .461 -1.750 .096 
MB HOM 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -2.069 28.262 .048 -.83 .400 -1.645 -.009 
Equal variances 
assumed .035 .852 -.720 57 .475 -.45 .628 -1.711 .806 
ALL HOM 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.688 20.304 .499 -.45 .658 -1.823 .918 
Equal variances 
assumed .011 .915 -.262 57 .794 -.10 .375 -.849 .653 
MB ASS 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.262 21.615 .796 -.10 .376 -.880 .683 
Equal variances 
assumed .024 .876 .294 57 .770 .21 .701 -1.198 1.610 
ALL ASS 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .299 22.233 .768 .21 .691 -1.226 1.639 
Equal variances 
assumed .012 .914 -1.353 57 .181 -1.91 1.411 -4.735 .916 
MB ROB 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.433 23.914 .165 -1.91 1.333 -4.660 .841 
Equal variances 
assumed .111 .741 1.556 57 .125 6.66 4.277 -1.908 15.222 
ALL ROB 
Equal variances 















Independent Samples Test (INT_2) 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 




Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances 
assumed 1.002 .321 -1.740 56 .087 -.83 .478 -1.791 .126 
MB HOM 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.979 24.164 .059 -.83 .421 -1.701 .036 
Equal variances 
assumed .028 .868 -.634 56 .529 -.41 .653 -1.721 .894 
ALL HOM 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.591 17.775 .562 -.41 .700 -1.885 1.058 
Equal variances 
assumed .023 .881 .031 56 .975 .01 .387 -.763 .787 
MB ASS 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .030 19.068 .976 .01 .393 -.810 .834 
Equal variances 
assumed .021 .886 .270 56 .788 .19 .722 -1.250 1.640 
ALL ASS 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .267 19.150 .793 .19 .731 -1.333 1.723 
Equal variances 
assumed .160 .691 -1.692 56 .096 -2.45 1.451 -5.362 .452 
MB ROB 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.842 22.326 .079 -2.45 1.332 -5.216 .306 
Equal variances 
assumed .003 .959 .994 56 .324 4.38 4.408 -4.447 13.213 
ALL ROB 
Equal variances 















Independent Samples Test (INT_3) 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 




Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances 
assumed 2.202 .144 -2.090 55 .041 -1.03 .492 -2.013 -.042 
MB HOM 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -2.535 23.880 .018 -1.03 .405 -1.865 -.191 
Equal variances 
assumed .142 .707 -.991 55 .326 -.67 .673 -2.015 .682 
ALL HOM 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.942 16.293 .360 -.67 .708 -2.165 .832 
Equal variances 
assumed .127 .723 -.570 55 .571 -.23 .400 -1.029 .573 
MB ASS 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.603 18.757 .554 -.23 .378 -1.019 .564 
Equal variances 
assumed .207 .651 .254 55 .801 .19 .744 -1.303 1.680 
ALL ASS 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .243 16.409 .811 .19 .778 -1.457 1.835 
Equal variances 
assumed .228 .635 -1.877 55 .066 -2.82 1.501 -5.824 .191 
MB ROB 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -2.059 19.856 .053 -2.82 1.368 -5.672 .039 
Equal variances 
assumed 1.345 .251 .202 55 .841 .93 4.617 -8.320 10.187 
ALL ROB 
Equal variances 















Independent Samples Test (INT_4) 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 




Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances 
assumed 1.953 .168 -1.732 54 .089 -.89 .516 -1.927 .141 
MB HOM 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -2.098 20.370 .049 -.89 .426 -1.780 -.006 
Equal variances 
assumed .016 .900 -.724 54 .472 -.51 .703 -1.918 .900 
ALL HOM 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.672 14.089 .512 -.51 .757 -2.132 1.114 
Equal variances 
assumed .010 .920 -.600 54 .551 -.25 .417 -1.087 .586 
MB ASS 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.619 15.871 .545 -.25 .405 -1.109 .608 
Equal variances 
assumed .143 .707 .039 54 .969 .03 .778 -1.528 1.589 
ALL ASS 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .037 14.287 .971 .03 .826 -1.739 1.799 
Equal variances 
assumed .197 .659 -2.053 54 .045 -3.19 1.556 -6.313 -.075 
MB ROB 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -2.243 17.170 .038 -3.19 1.424 -6.196 -.192 
Equal variances 
assumed 2.798 .100 -.247 54 .806 -1.19 4.821 -10.857 8.473 
ALL ROB 
Equal variances 












































MB HOM Pearson 
Correlation 1 .685(**) -.122 .095 .142 .058 .018 -.009 -.202 -.231 -.227 -.271(*) -.229 .318(*) .150 .102 .076 
 Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .355 .471 .278 .659 .891 .946 .121 .078 .087 .041 .089 .013 .251 .437 .563 
ALL HOM Pearson 
Correlation .685(**) 1 -.090 .036 .041 .056 .169 .042 -.052 -.095 -.084 -.132 -.098 .264(*) .125 .080 -.009 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . .495 .785 .756 .672 .197 .749 .691 .475 .529 .326 .472 .042 .342 .542 .945 
MB ASS Pearson 
Correlation -.122 -.090 1 -.116 -.043 -.059 .032 -.023 -.056 -.035 .004 -.077 -.081 -.240 -.112 -.048 .184 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .355 .495 . .378 .743 .657 .810 .863 .670 .794 .975 .571 .551 .065 .394 .715 .159 
ALL ASS Pearson 
Correlation .095 .036 -.116 1 -.010 -.131 .067 .162 .009 .039 .036 .034 .005 .167 -.189 -.168 -.017 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .471 .785 .378 . .942 .318 .608 .215 .948 .770 .788 .801 .969 .201 .149 .200 .895 
MB ROB Pearson 
Correlation .142 .041 -.043 -.010 1 .650(**) -.114 -.074 -.114 -.176 -.220 -.245 -.269(*) -.240 -.101 -.082 -.081 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .278 .756 .743 .942 . .000 .387 .573 .384 .181 .096 .066 .045 .065 .443 .531 .538 
ALL ROB Pearson 
Correlation .058 .056 -.059 -.131 .650(**) 1 .154 .300(*) .303(*) .202 .132 .027 -.034 -.202 -.050 -.202 -.362(**) 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .659 .672 .657 .318 .000 . .240 .020 .018 .125 .324 .841 .806 .121 .704 .122 .004 
UNEMPL Pearson 
Correlation .018 .169 .032 .067 -.114 .154 1 .734(**) .316(*) .286(*) .255 .242 .180 .044 -.103 -.533(**) -.243 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .891 .197 .810 .608 .387 .240 . .000 .014 .028 .053 .070 .185 .736 .433 .000 .062 
TREND Pearson 
Correlation -.009 .042 -.023 .162 -.074 .300(*) .734(**) 1 .750(**) .737(**) .722(**) .706(**) .688(**) .018 -.322(*) -.597(**) -.630(**) 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .946 .749 .863 .215 .573 .020 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .889 .012 .000 .000 
INT Pearson 
Correlation -.202 -.052 -.056 .009 -.114 .303(*) .316(*) .750(**) 1 .955(**) .910(**) .864(**) .817(**) -.094 -.252 -.291(*) -.630(**) 




Correlation -.231 -.095 -.035 .039 -.176 .202 .286(*) .737(**) .955(**) 1 .953(**) .905(**) .856(**) -.113 -.245 -.310(*) -.640(**) 




Correlation -.227 -.084 .004 .036 -.220 .132 .255 .722(**) .910(**) .953(**) 1 .950(**) .899(**) -.111 -.201 -.248 -.590(**) 




Correlation -.271(*) -.132 -.077 .034 -.245 .027 .242 .706(**) .864(**) .905(**) .950(**) 1 .947(**) -.076 -.160 -.241 -.563(**) 




Correlation -.229 -.098 -.081 .005 -.269(*) -.034 .180 .688(**) .817(**) .856(**) .899(**) .947(**) 1 .005 -.184 -.215 -.539(**) 




Correlation .318(*) .264(*) -.240 .167 -.240 -.202 .044 .018 -.094 -.113 -.111 -.076 .005 1 -.041 .186 .282(*) 




Correlation .150 .125 -.112 -.189 -.101 -.050 -.103 -.322(*) -.252 -.245 -.201 -.160 -.184 -.041 1 .268(*) .203 




Correlation .102 .080 -.048 -.168 -.082 -.202 -.533(**) -.597(**) -.291(*) -.310(*) -.248 -.241 -.215 .186 .268(*) 1 .493(**) 




Correlation .076 -.009 .184 -.017 -.081 -.362(**) -.243 -.630(**) -.630(**) -.640(**) -.590(**) -.563(**) -.539(**) .282(*) .203 .493(**) 1 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .563 .945 .159 .895 .538 .004 .062 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .029 .121 .000 . 
 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 120
Figure E: Selected Multiple Regression Models 
 
Regression: MB HOM = constant + LAGS (INT, 3) + MEANTEMP 
 
 Model Summary(b) 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .390(a) .152 .121 1.461 
a  Predictors: (Constant), MEANTEMP, LAGS(INT,3) 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 20.737 2 10.369 4.856 .011(a) 
Residual 115.298 54 2.135    
1 
Total 136.035 56     
a  Predictors: (Constant), MEANTEMP, LAGS(INT,3) 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) .467 .624  .749 .457 
LAGS(INT,3) -.947 .476 -.250 -1.988 .052 
1 
MEANTEMP .026 .012 .282 2.242 .029 
a  Dependent Variable: MB HOM 
 
 
 Residuals Statistics(a) 
 
  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -.03 2.42 1.56 .609 57 
Residual -2.28 3.67 .00 1.435 57 
Std. Predicted Value -2.610 1.403 .000 1.000 57 
Std. Residual -1.563 2.515 .000 .982 57 



















































Normal P-P Plot of Regression Stand


























Regression: MB HOM = constant + LAGS (INT, 4) + MEANTEMP 
 









MEANTEMP(a) . Enter 
a  All requested variables entered. 
b  Dependent Variable: MB HOM 
 
 
 Model Summary(b) 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .384(a) .148 .116 1.467 
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,4), MEANTEMP 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 19.792 2 9.896 4.595 .014(a) 
Residual 114.137 53 2.154    
1 
Total 133.929 55     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,4), MEANTEMP 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) .304 .618  .491 .625 
MEANTEMP .029 .012 .308 2.433 .018 
1 
LAGS(INT,4) -.899 .494 -.231 -1.822 .074 
a  Dependent Variable: MB HOM 
 
 
 Residuals Statistics(a) 
 
  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value .03 2.42 1.54 .600 56 
Residual -2.28 3.68 .00 1.441 56 
Std. Predicted Value -2.508 1.477 .000 1.000 56 
Std. Residual -1.553 2.505 .000 .982 56 
















































Normal P-P Plot of Regression Stand




































Regression: MB ROB = constant + LAGS (INT, 3) + MEANTEMP 
 
 









MEANTEMP(a) . Enter 
a  All requested variables entered. 
b  Dependent Variable: MB ROB 
 
 
 Model Summary(b) 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .391(a) .153 .122 4.426 
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,3), MEANTEMP 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 191.233 2 95.616 4.882 .011(a) 
Residual 1057.644 54 19.586    
1 
Total 1248.877 56     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,3), MEANTEMP 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 13.711 1.890  7.256 .000 
MEANTEMP -.087 .036 -.306 -2.434 .018 
1 
LAGS(INT,3) -3.083 1.442 -.269 -2.138 .037 
a  Dependent Variable: MB ROB 
 
 
 Residuals Statistics(a) 
 
  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 4.71 12.13 8.81 1.848 57 
Residual -8.20 12.25 .00 4.346 57 
Std. Predicted Value -2.215 1.801 .000 1.000 57 
Std. Residual -1.854 2.767 .000 .982 57 











































Normal P-P Plot of Regression Stand


























Regression: MB ROB = constant + LAGS (INT, 4) + MEANTEMP 
 









MEANTEMP(a) . Enter 
a  All requested variables entered. 
b  Dependent Variable: MB ROB 
 
 
 Model Summary(b) 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .393(a) .154 .122 4.458 
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,4), MEANTEMP 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 192.156 2 96.078 4.834 .012(a) 
Residual 1053.398 53 19.875    
1 
Total 1245.554 55     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,4), MEANTEMP 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 13.448 1.879  7.157 .000 
MEANTEMP -.081 .036 -.286 -2.265 .028 
1 
LAGS(INT,4) -3.176 1.500 -.268 -2.118 .039 
a  Dependent Variable: MB ROB 
 
 
 Residuals Statistics(a) 
 
  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 4.74 12.06 8.84 1.869 56 
Residual -8.17 12.38 .00 4.376 56 
Std. Predicted Value -2.192 1.720 .000 1.000 56 
Std. Residual -1.832 2.777 .000 .982 56 
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Appendix F: Multiple Regression Models Using MB HOM, all 
Intervention Variables and all other Independent Variables 
 
Regression: MB HOM = constant + INT + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + UNEMPL 
+ FELONYAR + TREND 
 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .486(a) .236 .133 1.429 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 32.755 7 4.679 2.292 .041(a) 
Residual 106.178 52 2.042    
1 
Total 138.933 59     
a  Predictors: (Constant), MISDARR, STATEPRI, UNEMPL, MEANTEMP, INT, FELONYAR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -.953 2.769  -.344 .732 
UNEMPL -.237 .236 -.234 -1.004 .320 
TREND .749 .396 .711 1.891 .064 
INT -2.154 .810 -.613 -2.659 .010 
MEANTEMP .024 .012 .266 1.950 .057 
STATEPRI .031 .022 .186 1.394 .169 
FELONYAR .007 .007 .185 1.062 .293 
1 
MISDARR -.001 .002 -.123 -.632 .530 

























Regression: MB HOM = constant + LAGS (INT, 1) + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + 
UNEMPL + FELONYAR + TREND 
 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .493(a) .243 .139 1.424 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 33.167 7 4.738 2.338 .038(a) 
Residual 103.376 51 2.027    
1 
Total 136.542 58     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,1), MEANTEMP, STATEPRI, UNEMPL, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -.490 2.785  -.176 .861 
UNEMPL -.215 .241 -.213 -.895 .375 
TREND .641 .389 .598 1.645 .106 
MEANTEMP .024 .012 .258 1.915 .061 
STATEPRI .037 .023 .209 1.605 .115 
FELONYAR .006 .006 .164 .972 .336 
MISDARR -.002 .002 -.167 -.837 .406 
1 
LAGS(INT,1) -2.097 .795 -.586 -2.637 .011 




















Regression: MB HOM = constant + LAGS (INT, 2) + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + 
UNEMPL + FELONYAR + TREND 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .504(a) .254 .149 1.426 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 34.545 7 4.935 2.427 .032(a) 
Residual 101.679 50 2.034    
1 
Total 136.224 57     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,2), MEANTEMP, STATEPRI, UNEMPL, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -1.613 2.785  -.579 .565 
UNEMPL -.305 .255 -.300 -1.197 .237 
TREND .831 .432 .757 1.925 .060 
MEANTEMP .024 .013 .255 1.891 .064 
STATEPRI .047 .024 .264 1.968 .055 
FELONYAR .007 .007 .187 1.098 .278 
MISDARR -.001 .002 -.104 -.524 .603 
1 
LAGS(INT,2) -2.316 .832 -.630 -2.783 .008 































Regression: MB HOM = constant + LAGS (INT, 3) + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + 
UNEMPL + FELONYAR + TREND 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .570(a) .325 .228 1.369 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 44.172 7 6.310 3.366 .005(a) 
Residual 91.863 49 1.875    
1 
Total 136.035 56     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,3), MEANTEMP, STATEPRI, UNEMPL, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -1.517 2.692  -.564 .576 
UNEMPL -.374 .242 -.363 -1.546 .128 
TREND .982 .399 .872 2.464 .017 
MEANTEMP .027 .012 .290 2.243 .029 
STATEPRI .051 .023 .285 2.226 .031 
FELONYAR .006 .006 .165 1.048 .300 
MISDARR -.001 .002 -.106 -.564 .576 
1 
LAGS(INT,3) -2.847 .773 -.751 -3.683 .001 




















Regression: MB HOM = constant + LAGS (INT, 4) + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + 
UNEMPL + FELONYAR + TREND 
 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .566(a) .320 .221 1.377 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 42.871 7 6.124 3.228 .007(a) 
Residual 91.058 48 1.897    
1 
Total 133.929 55     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,4), MEANTEMP, UNEMPL, STATEPRI, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -.881 2.713  -.325 .747 
UNEMPL -.409 .255 -.390 -1.600 .116 
TREND .990 .411 .862 2.407 .020 
MEANTEMP .035 .012 .379 2.860 .006 
STATEPRI .047 .023 .262 2.033 .048 
FELONYAR .005 .006 .119 .765 .448 
MISDARR -.001 .002 -.119 -.628 .533 
1 
LAGS(INT,4) -2.900 .819 -.745 -3.542 .001 










































Appendix G: Multiple Regression Models Using ALL HOM, all 
Intervention Variables and all other Independent Variables 
 
Regression: ALL HOM = constant + INT + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + UNEMPL 
+ FELONYAR + TREND 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .415(a) .172 .060 1.974 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 42.025 7 6.004 1.541 .174(a) 
Residual 202.559 52 3.895    
1 
Total 244.583 59     
a  Predictors: (Constant), INT, MEANTEMP, STATEPRI, UNEMPL, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -.747 3.825  -.195 .846 
UNEMPL .545 .326 .405 1.671 .101 
TREND -.352 .547 -.252 -.644 .522 
MEANTEMP .036 .017 .300 2.115 .039 
STATEPRI .019 .030 .088 .629 .532 
FELONYAR .010 .009 .202 1.118 .269 
MISDARR -.005 .003 -.327 -1.618 .112 
1 
INT -.411 1.119 -.088 -.367 .715 


























Regression: ALL HOM = constant + LAGS (INT, 1) + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI 




Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .427(a) .182 .070 1.972 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 44.248 7 6.321 1.626 .149(a) 
Residual 198.294 51 3.888    
1 
Total 242.542 58     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,1), MEANTEMP, STATEPRI, UNEMPL, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -.191 3.858  -.049 .961 
UNEMPL .429 .333 .318 1.286 .204 
TREND -.093 .539 -.065 -.173 .863 
MEANTEMP .036 .017 .296 2.114 .039 
STATEPRI .015 .032 .064 .476 .636 
FELONYAR .010 .009 .200 1.142 .259 
MISDARR -.005 .003 -.320 -1.547 .128 
1 
LAGS(INT,1) -1.104 1.101 -.232 -1.002 .321 































Regression: ALL HOM = constant + LAGS (INT, 2) + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI 
+ UNEMPL + FELONYAR + TREND 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .432(a) .187 .073 1.985 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 45.286 7 6.469 1.642 .146(a) 
Residual 197.058 50 3.941    
1 
Total 242.345 57     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,2), MEANTEMP, STATEPRI, UNEMPL, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -1.016 3.877  -.262 .794 
UNEMPL .368 .355 .271 1.037 .305 
TREND .031 .601 .021 .052 .959 
MEANTEMP .038 .018 .303 2.156 .036 
STATEPRI .024 .033 .100 .715 .478 
FELONYAR .010 .009 .198 1.116 .270 
MISDARR -.004 .003 -.284 -1.365 .178 
1 
LAGS(INT,2) -1.144 1.159 -.233 -.988 .328 































Regression: ALL HOM = constant + LAGS (INT, 3) + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI 
+ UNEMPL + FELONYAR + TREND 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .495(a) .245 .137 1.924 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 58.881 7 8.412 2.273 .044(a) 
Residual 181.329 49 3.701    
1 
Total 240.211 56     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,3), MEANTEMP, STATEPRI, UNEMPL, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -.521 3.782  -.138 .891 
UNEMPL .239 .340 .174 .703 .485 
TREND .366 .560 .244 .654 .516 
MEANTEMP .041 .017 .334 2.437 .018 
STATEPRI .026 .032 .110 .810 .422 
FELONYAR .010 .009 .193 1.157 .253 
MISDARR -.004 .003 -.304 -1.529 .133 
1 
LAGS(INT,3) -2.162 1.086 -.429 -1.991 .052 
































Regression: ALL HOM = constant + LAGS (INT, 4) + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI 
+ UNEMPL + FELONYAR + TREND 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .507(a) .257 .148 1.920 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 61.102 7 8.729 2.368 .037(a) 
Residual 176.898 48 3.685    
1 
Total 238.000 55     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,4), MEANTEMP, UNEMPL, STATEPRI, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) .056 3.781  .015 .988 
UNEMPL .254 .356 .182 .715 .478 
TREND .326 .573 .213 .569 .572 
MEANTEMP .049 .017 .393 2.836 .007 
STATEPRI .021 .032 .090 .668 .507 
FELONYAR .008 .009 .156 .958 .343 
MISDARR -.005 .003 -.325 -1.644 .107 
1 
LAGS(INT,4) -2.098 1.141 -.404 -1.839 .072 












































Appendix H: Multiple Regression Models Using MB ASS, all 
Intervention Variables and all other Independent Variables 
 
Regression: MB ASS = constant + INT + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + UNEMPL 
+ FELONYAR + TREND 
 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .440(a) .194 .085 1.159 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 16.764 7 2.395 1.784 .110(a) 
Residual 69.820 52 1.343    
1 
Total 86.583 59     
a  Predictors: (Constant), INT, MEANTEMP, STATEPRI, UNEMPL, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) .185 2.245  .082 .935 
UNEMPL -.086 .191 -.108 -.450 .655 
TREND .279 .321 .335 .867 .390 
MEANTEMP -.028 .010 -.382 -2.724 .009 
STATEPRI -.017 .018 -.127 -.925 .359 
FELONYAR -.002 .005 -.063 -.351 .727 
MISDARR .004 .002 .509 2.551 .014 
1 
INT -.108 .657 -.039 -.165 .870 














Regression: MB ASS = constant + LAGS (INT, 1) + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + 
UNEMPL + FELONYAR + TREND 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .437(a) .191 .080 1.166 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 16.386 7 2.341 1.722 .125(a) 
Residual 69.343 51 1.360    
1 
Total 85.729 58     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,1), MEANTEMP, STATEPRI, UNEMPL, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -.008 2.281  -.004 .997 
UNEMPL -.029 .197 -.036 -.145 .885 
TREND .140 .319 .164 .438 .664 
MEANTEMP -.027 .010 -.375 -2.690 .010 
STATEPRI -.014 .019 -.103 -.767 .447 
FELONYAR -.002 .005 -.070 -.401 .690 
MISDARR .004 .002 .502 2.441 .018 
1 
LAGS(INT,1) .246 .651 .087 .377 .708 


















Regression: MB ASS = constant + LAGS (INT, 2) + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + 
UNEMPL + FELONYAR + TREND 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .434(a) .189 .075 1.171 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 15.963 7 2.280 1.662 .140(a) 
Residual 68.606 50 1.372    
1 
Total 84.569 57     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,2), MEANTEMP, STATEPRI, UNEMPL, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -.025 2.287  -.011 .991 
UNEMPL -.011 .210 -.014 -.053 .958 
TREND .095 .355 .110 .267 .790 
MEANTEMP -.026 .010 -.358 -2.547 .014 
STATEPRI -.014 .019 -.099 -.709 .481 
FELONYAR -.003 .005 -.091 -.512 .611 
MISDARR .004 .002 .507 2.442 .018 
1 
LAGS(INT,2) .421 .684 .145 .616 .541 
































Regression: MB ASS = constant + LAGS (INT, 3) + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + 
UNEMPL + FELONYAR + TREND 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .448(a) .201 .087 1.168 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 16.831 7 2.404 1.761 .117(a) 
Residual 66.889 49 1.365    
1 
Total 83.719 56     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,3), MEANTEMP, STATEPRI, UNEMPL, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -.384 2.297  -.167 .868 
UNEMPL -.106 .206 -.131 -.513 .610 
TREND .299 .340 .339 .880 .383 
MEANTEMP -.029 .010 -.397 -2.816 .007 
STATEPRI -.009 .020 -.062 -.446 .657 
FELONYAR -.001 .005 -.041 -.240 .811 
MISDARR .005 .002 .531 2.592 .013 
1 
LAGS(INT,3) -.104 .659 -.035 -.158 .875 
































Regression: MB ASS = constant + LAGS (INT, 4) + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + 
UNEMPL + FELONYAR + TREND 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .450(a) .203 .087 1.179 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 16.985 7 2.426 1.745 .121(a) 
Residual 66.729 48 1.390    
1 
Total 83.714 55     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,4), MEANTEMP, UNEMPL, STATEPRI, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -.424 2.322  -.183 .856 
UNEMPL -.087 .219 -.105 -.400 .691 
TREND .243 .352 .268 .691 .493 
MEANTEMP -.029 .011 -.402 -2.801 .007 
STATEPRI -.009 .020 -.066 -.470 .641 
FELONYAR -.001 .005 -.043 -.253 .801 
MISDARR .005 .002 .530 2.589 .013 
1 
LAGS(INT,4) .059 .701 .019 .084 .933 












































Appendix I: Multiple Regression Models Using ALL ASS, all 
Intervention Variables and all other Independent Variables 
 
Regression: ALL ASS = constant + INT + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + UNEMPL 
+ FELONYAR + TREND 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .368(a) .136 .019 2.250 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 41.373 7 5.910 1.167 .338(a) 
Residual 263.361 52 5.065    
1 
Total 304.733 59     
a  Predictors: (Constant), INT, MEANTEMP, STATEPRI, UNEMPL, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 5.515 4.361  1.265 .212 
UNEMPL -.542 .372 -.361 -1.457 .151 
TREND 1.018 .624 .652 1.631 .109 
MEANTEMP .016 .020 .120 .824 .413 
STATEPRI -.021 .035 -.086 -.604 .549 
FELONYAR -.008 .010 -.141 -.763 .449 
MISDARR .003 .003 .158 .767 .447 
1 
INT -1.655 1.276 -.318 -1.297 .200 


























Regression: ALL ASS = constant + LAGS (INT, 1) + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + 
UNEMPL + FELONYAR + TREND 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .277(a) .076 -.055 2.334 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 22.099 7 3.157 .580 .769(a) 
Residual 266.884 49 5.447    
1 
Total 288.982 56     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,3), MEANTEMP, STATEPRI, UNEMPL, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 5.264 4.588  1.147 .257 
UNEMPL -.398 .412 -.265 -.966 .339 
TREND .558 .679 .340 .821 .415 
MEANTEMP .018 .021 .129 .854 .397 
STATEPRI -.024 .039 -.094 -.624 .536 
FELONYAR -.011 .011 -.186 -1.008 .319 
MISDARR .003 .004 .202 .919 .363 
1 
LAGS(INT,3) -.429 1.317 -.078 -.326 .746 




















Regression: ALL ASS = constant + LAGS (INT, 2) + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + 
UNEMPL + FELONYAR + TREND 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .321(a) .103 -.020 2.295 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 30.965 7 4.424 .840 .560(a) 
Residual 268.696 51 5.269    
1 
Total 299.661 58     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,1), MEANTEMP, STATEPRI, UNEMPL, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 5.759 4.491  1.282 .206 
UNEMPL -.480 .388 -.321 -1.238 .221 
TREND .788 .628 .496 1.256 .215 
MEANTEMP .019 .020 .141 .963 .340 
STATEPRI -.024 .037 -.093 -.657 .514 
FELONYAR -.011 .010 -.189 -1.034 .306 
MISDARR .003 .003 .182 .842 .404 
1 
LAGS(INT,1) -.975 1.282 -.184 -.761 .450 





















Regression: ALL ASS = constant + LAGS (INT, 3) + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + 




Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .296(a) .088 -.040 2.318 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 25.834 7 3.691 .687 .682(a) 
Residual 268.580 50 5.372    
1 
Total 294.414 57     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,2), MEANTEMP, STATEPRI, UNEMPL, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 5.601 4.526  1.238 .222 
UNEMPL -.418 .415 -.280 -1.008 .318 
TREND .635 .702 .393 .905 .370 
MEANTEMP .018 .020 .134 .902 .372 
STATEPRI -.027 .038 -.103 -.695 .491 
FELONYAR -.011 .011 -.187 -.997 .324 
MISDARR .003 .004 .188 .852 .398 
1 
LAGS(INT,2) -.639 1.353 -.118 -.473 .639 




















Regression: ALL ASS = constant + LAGS (INT, 4) + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + 




Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .313(a) .098 -.034 2.329 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 28.233 7 4.033 .744 .636(a) 
Residual 260.320 48 5.423    
1 
Total 288.554 55     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,4), MEANTEMP, UNEMPL, STATEPRI, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 5.580 4.587  1.217 .230 
UNEMPL -.561 .432 -.365 -1.300 .200 
TREND .920 .695 .546 1.323 .192 
MEANTEMP .021 .021 .156 1.023 .312 
STATEPRI -.021 .039 -.082 -.553 .583 
FELONYAR -.010 .010 -.176 -.980 .332 
MISDARR .003 .004 .193 .887 .379 
1 
LAGS(INT,4) -1.455 1.384 -.255 -1.051 .298 












































Appendix J: Multiple Regression Models Using MB ROB, all 
Intervention Variables and all other Independent Variables 
 
Regression: MB ROB = constant + INT + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + UNEMPL 
+ FELONYAR + TREND 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .354(a) .125 .008 4.647 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 161.105 7 23.015 1.066 .399(a) 
Residual 1123.078 52 21.598    
1 
Total 1284.183 59     
a  Predictors: (Constant), INT, MEANTEMP, STATEPRI, UNEMPL, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 24.221 9.005  2.690 .010 
UNEMPL -.636 .768 -.207 -.829 .411 
TREND .636 1.289 .199 .494 .623 
MEANTEMP -.065 .041 -.233 -1.598 .116 
STATEPRI -.059 .072 -.118 -.822 .415 
FELONYAR -.005 .021 -.045 -.243 .809 
MISDARR -.003 .007 -.099 -.477 .635 
1 
INT -3.475 2.635 -.325 -1.319 .193 

















Regression: MB ROB = constant + LAGS (INT, 1) + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + 
UNEMPL + FELONYAR + TREND 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .418(a) .174 .061 4.500 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 218.158 7 31.165 1.539 .175(a) 
Residual 1032.792 51 20.251    
1 
Total 1250.949 58     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,1), MEANTEMP, STATEPRI, UNEMPL, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 25.206 8.804  2.863 .006 
UNEMPL -.702 .761 -.229 -.922 .361 
TREND .795 1.231 .245 .646 .521 
MEANTEMP -.074 .039 -.265 -1.883 .065 
STATEPRI -.030 .072 -.057 -.421 .675 
FELONYAR -.001 .020 -.007 -.038 .970 
MISDARR -.006 .007 -.178 -.854 .397 
1 
LAGS(INT,1) -4.880 2.514 -.451 -1.942 .058 




















Regression: MB ROB = constant + LAGS (INT, 2) + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + 
UNEMPL + FELONYAR + TREND 
 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .453(a) .206 .094 4.457 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 256.980 7 36.711 1.848 .099(a) 
Residual 993.296 50 19.866    
1 
Total 1250.276 57     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,2), MEANTEMP, STATEPRI, UNEMPL, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 23.606 8.703  2.712 .009 
UNEMPL -.874 .797 -.284 -1.096 .278 
TREND 1.182 1.350 .355 .876 .385 
MEANTEMP -.080 .039 -.284 -2.043 .046 
STATEPRI -.021 .074 -.039 -.283 .778 
FELONYAR .004 .020 .033 .188 .852 
MISDARR -.005 .007 -.150 -.732 .467 
1 
LAGS(INT,2) -5.845 2.602 -.525 -2.247 .029 




















Regression: MB ROB = constant + LAGS (INT, 3) + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + 
UNEMPL + FELONYAR + TREND 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .460(a) .212 .099 4.482 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 264.637 7 37.805 1.882 .093(a) 
Residual 984.240 49 20.087    
1 
Total 1248.877 56     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,3), MEANTEMP, STATEPRI, UNEMPL, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 23.770 8.811  2.698 .010 
UNEMPL -.857 .792 -.274 -1.082 .284 
TREND 1.103 1.305 .323 .845 .402 
MEANTEMP -.072 .040 -.253 -1.811 .076 
STATEPRI -.015 .075 -.028 -.205 .838 
FELONYAR .001 .020 .005 .029 .977 
MISDARR -.005 .007 -.149 -.732 .468 
1 
LAGS(INT,3) -5.897 2.530 -.514 -2.331 .024 




















Regression: MB ROB = constant + LAGS (INT, 4) + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + 
UNEMPL + FELONYAR + TREND 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .468(a) .219 .105 4.501 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 272.976 7 38.997 1.925 .086(a) 
Residual 972.578 48 20.262    
1 
Total 1245.554 55     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,4), MEANTEMP, UNEMPL, STATEPRI, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 24.655 8.866  2.781 .008 
UNEMPL -1.085 .835 -.339 -1.300 .200 
TREND 1.266 1.344 .362 .942 .351 
MEANTEMP -.060 .040 -.212 -1.492 .142 
STATEPRI -.019 .075 -.035 -.254 .800 
FELONYAR -.001 .020 -.009 -.056 .955 
MISDARR -.004 .007 -.125 -.616 .541 
1 
LAGS(INT,4) -6.308 2.675 -.531 -2.358 .022 












































Appendix K: Multiple Regression Models Using ALL ROB, all 
Intervention Variables and all other Independent Variables 
 
Regression: ALL ROB = constant + INT + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + UNEMPL 




Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .402(a) .162 .049 13.759 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 1900.083 7 271.440 1.434 .212(a) 
Residual 9844.500 52 189.317    
1 
Total 11744.583 59     
a  Predictors: (Constant), INT, MEANTEMP, STATEPRI, UNEMPL, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 60.834 26.662  2.282 .027 
UNEMPL -.178 2.273 -.019 -.078 .938 
TREND 1.729 3.815 .178 .453 .652 
MEANTEMP -.122 .120 -.145 -1.017 .314 
STATEPRI .072 .212 .048 .339 .736 
FELONYAR .008 .063 .023 .125 .901 
MISDARR -.020 .020 -.200 -.982 .331 
1 
INT 1.771 7.800 .055 .227 .821 


























Regression: ALL ROB = constant + LAGS (INT, 1) + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + 
UNEMPL + FELONYAR + TREND 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .430(a) .185 .073 13.622 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 2143.985 7 306.284 1.650 .143(a) 
Residual 9464.151 51 185.572    
1 
Total 11608.136 58     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,1), MEANTEMP, STATEPRI, UNEMPL, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 63.166 26.652  2.370 .022 
UNEMPL -1.074 2.302 -.115 -.466 .643 
TREND 4.331 3.727 .438 1.162 .251 
MEANTEMP -.161 .119 -.189 -1.353 .182 
STATEPRI .138 .218 .085 .634 .529 
FELONYAR .035 .062 .099 .569 .572 
MISDARR -.027 .021 -.273 -1.320 .193 
1 
LAGS(INT,1) -7.652 7.609 -.232 -1.006 .319 



















Regression: ALL ROB = constant + LAGS (INT, 2) + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + 




Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .449(a) .201 .089 13.358 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 2246.655 7 320.951 1.799 .108(a) 
Residual 8922.241 50 178.445    
1 
Total 11168.897 57     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,2), MEANTEMP, STATEPRI, UNEMPL, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 63.336 26.085  2.428 .019 
UNEMPL -1.440 2.389 -.156 -.603 .549 
TREND 5.267 4.045 .530 1.302 .199 
MEANTEMP -.190 .118 -.225 -1.613 .113 
STATEPRI .122 .222 .076 .548 .586 
FELONYAR .051 .061 .148 .839 .406 
MISDARR -.028 .020 -.282 -1.369 .177 
1 
LAGS(INT,2) -11.664 7.798 -.351 -1.496 .141 
































Regression: ALL ROB = constant + LAGS (INT, 3) + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + 
UNEMPL + FELONYAR + TREND 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .515(a) .266 .161 12.908 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 2953.367 7 421.910 2.532 .026(a) 
Residual 8163.686 49 166.606    
1 
Total 11117.053 56     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,3), MEANTEMP, STATEPRI, UNEMPL, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 62.797 25.377  2.475 .017 
UNEMPL -2.553 2.280 -.274 -1.120 .268 
TREND 7.791 3.758 .765 2.073 .043 
MEANTEMP -.181 .114 -.215 -1.589 .119 
STATEPRI .177 .216 .109 .819 .417 
FELONYAR .056 .058 .157 .955 .344 
MISDARR -.027 .020 -.270 -1.375 .175 
1 
LAGS(INT,3) -19.171 7.286 -.560 -2.631 .011 
































Regression: ALL ROB = constant + LAGS (INT, 4) + MEANTEMP + STATEPRI + 




Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .558(a) .311 .211 12.624 





Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 3456.902 7 493.843 3.099 .009(a) 
Residual 7649.312 48 159.361    
1 
Total 11106.214 55     
a  Predictors: (Constant), LAGS(INT,4), MEANTEMP, UNEMPL, STATEPRI, FELONYAR, MISDARR, TREND 








Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 67.138 24.864  2.700 .010 
UNEMPL -3.730 2.341 -.391 -1.593 .118 
TREND 9.590 3.770 .917 2.544 .014 
MEANTEMP -.127 .113 -.150 -1.124 .267 
STATEPRI .172 .211 .106 .819 .417 
FELONYAR .050 .057 .139 .884 .381 
MISDARR -.026 .019 -.259 -1.360 .180 
1 
LAGS(INT,4) -24.236 7.502 -.684 -3.230 .002 
a  Dependent Variable: ALL ROB 
 
 
